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 Afghanistan is emerging from more than two decades of conflict, capped by a 
severe nationwide drought in 1999-2001, and faces a complex, interrelated set of 
political, administrative, economic, and social challenge. The objective of this study was 
to analyze Afghanistan’s human development based on specific criteria such as economic 
inequality and poverty, corruption, public health and most specifically children and 
women’s health. This thesis identifies Afghanistan’s challenges and impediments to 
development and state-building in the past nine years. I further argue that Afghanistan 
was successful in economic and public health matters due to the institutions that were 
built at the national, regional and local levels with a somewhat structured cooperation. 
International organizations, NGOs and Western states who are involvement in the 
development of Afghanistan each want to dominate and lead the reconstruction and this 
creates an even more chaotic and un-manageable situation. This paper starts with a 
background description of Afghanistan followed by specific reasons as to why the 
international sphere should focus on rebuilding and securing Afghanistan.  
Finally, I discuss on how to address the existing challenges facing Afghanistan by 












Afghanistan has been in the news for the past couple of years; its issues have become a 
centripetal theme to the presidency of two American presidents, and the headlines of the 
first decade of the 21st century. The main issues of Afghanistan that affects the entire 
international community are: Terrorism, narcotics and its geopolitical map in the near 
east. Much work has been done to develop Afghanistan after the 2001 U.S led invasion, 
however, today Afghanistan still faces many of the same challenges it faced almost a 
decade ago. In this research, I will try to identify the impediments to development and 
state-building in the past nine years in Afghanistan and identify a methodology to 
overcome the development and stability roadblocks that Afghanistan faces today. I will 
analyze the success and failures of Afghanistan’s economic and public health 
development. For my hypothesis I will argue that institutions must be developed at the 
national, regional, and local levels and a structured cooperation among them will advance 
the development process in Afghanistan. I anticipate to find why is it what are the factors 
that improved Afghanistan’s economy and its public health and why is that other field do 
not prosper as well.  I will base my arguments on the following theories: Complex 
Interdependence Theory, Constructivism and Dependency Theory. In the thesis, I will 
delve into more detail as to: 1) why Afghanistan and its development are crucial to the 
international community, 2) what has been an imperative to its development in the last 
decade, 3) what can be done to fix this problem 4) how to applying various international 
relation theories combined with the past experiences and the views of Afghanistan 
experts to solving these problems. 
  Afghanistan is emerging from more than two decades of conflict, capped by a 
severe nation-wide drought in 1999-2001, and faces a complex, interrelated set of 
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political, administrative, economic, and social challenges. The government leadership is 
politically, financially and militarily supported by the international community. This 
support has borne fruit in the form of rapid economic growth, rising incomes, initial 
revival of public administration, and other improvements.1 Despite these gains, 
Afghanistan remains among the poorest countries in the world (average yearly per capita 
GDP of around US$300 including opium), and it is a highly fragmented society where 
the authority of the government is contested.2  
 Continuation of recent positive development is subject to serious risks: political, 
security, drug-related, macroeconomic, institutional, and climatic.  More than 20 years of 
conflict in Afghanistan resulted in the collapse of the national state as a legitimate 
political entity with monopoly over the legitimate use of force. After the US-led invasion 
of Afghanistan, the international community had no other choice than to start a state-
building agenda including: creating political organizations, improvements in security, 
administrative capacity-building, and other key components. What we mean by building 
a state is one that can protect rights, provide services, and promote security; it requires a 
number of interdependent processes. At a minimum these includes:  
i. Demobilizing and dissolving all armed forces not controlled by the state. 
ii. Forming and training armed forces and police to protect international and domestic 
security in accordance with law.  
iii. Forming and training all components of a legal system, from legislators to judges and 
prosecutors, to provide a legal framework for the functioning of the state and other social 
relations.3 
iv. Raising revenue in accordance with law to pay for the functioning of the state. 
                                                           
1 Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report 
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank 
2 Ibid. p.xi 
3 Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report 
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank, p. 31 
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v. Creating and training an administration capable of raising revenue and providing 
services to citizens and other inhabitants. 
vi. State- building and nation building after a post conflict recovery is the most 
challenging concern for Afghanistan, multiple requirement need to occur in order to keep 
itself together as a state.4  
 
 Just like those living in any other poor country, the Afghan people want their 
state, economy and society to function and they know that the current dysfunctional state 
stands between them and a better life. In order to understand the struggle of the Afghan 
people it is important to recapitulate the early years of the Taliban regime because of the 
events that occurred then, which effectively shaped the difficulties that the Afghans have 
to face today.  In the 1990s, especially in the last years of the Taliban Regime, little 
humanitarian aid flew to Afghanistan, which was problematic. The U.N, Red Cross and a 
handful of NGO relief agencies kept millions of Afghans alive with food supplies and ran 
the few hospitals and schools that still functioned. Nearly one million Afghans were 
displaced inside the country, and a new flow of refugees was arriving in Pakistan and 
Iran.  The Taliban had no concern for the public, nor any sense of responsibility toward 
them, rather, they created roadblocks for the UN, determined to make it as difficult as 
possible for international agencies to operate there.5  Just before the attack of 9/11 the 
entire international aid program for keeping millions of Afghans alive was on the verge 
of collapse and a humanitarian and political crisis was clearly brewing.  After the 
American invasion, the Afghan people’s living situation deteriorated and the international 
community’s job to help stabilize the country became more difficult.  
                                                           
4 Afghanistan State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty A Country Economic Report, 
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit South Asia Region September 9, 2004, Report 
No. 29551-AF, Document of the World Bank, p. 31 
5 Rashid. Ahmad, Descent into chaos: The U.S and the disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. 




Why Afghanistan matters? 
 
 The issue of nation-building in Afghanistan is important because the failure to 
maintain basic order not only makes fear a constant part of daily life for Afghans, but 
also provides a breeding ground for a small minority to perpetuate criminality and terror. 
As 9/11 and subsequent attacks showed, people in prosperous countries can no longer 
take the security of their daily lives for granted. This problem, failed states, is at the heart 
of a worldwide systemic crisis that constitutes the most serious challenges to global 
stability in the new millennium.  Slowly but surely, politicians, generals and business 
leaders are beginning to realize that we must arrest and reverse state failure.  Politicians 
now understand that issues such as refugee flows and humanitarian action have their 
roots in the failure of states to provide basic opportunities for their citizens.6 Security 
organizations recognize that crumbling states are at the root of ongoing conflicts, 
terrorism, and expanding networks of criminality that traffic in drugs, arms and people.7  
Development institutions are beginning to discover that an effective state is the necessary 
condition for eradicating poverty.8 And corporations have come to comprehend that 
market stability and growth stem from strong institutions everywhere, not just in the 
countries where they do business. A consensus is now emerging that only a sovereign 
state, by which we mean a state that actually performs the functions that make them 
sovereign will allow human progress to continue.9  
 If we want to stop international terrorism, we need to pay more attention to failed 
states, because groups involved with terrorism, criminality, arms and narcotics thrive and 
                                                           
6 Ghani, Ashraf, Lockhart Clare, Fixing Failed States, A Framework For Rebuilding A Fractured World. 
Oxford University Press, p. 4 
7 Ibid. p.4 




fester in areas of misrule. Some of the international responses to Afghanistan’s insecurity 
problems have been counterproductive because often the issues surrounding the problems 
are complex, and quick impact tasks do not address the nature of the problems; using 
atavistic, haphazard, fragmented, and short-term responses that sometimes exacerbate the 
collection of problems we set out to fix.10 The first impulse has been on use force. But we 
have reached the limits to the use of force, since the war in Afghanistan has not been 
successful. This insight was articulated in the 18th century by thinkers as diverse as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke. 
 In 1762 in the Social Contract, Rousseau wrote that the “strongest is never strong 
enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into 
duty.11 Similarly, Burke in his 1775 Speech of Moving Resolutions for Conciliation with 
the Colonies argues, “the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a 
moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again: and a nation is not 
governed, which is perpetually to be conquered.12 Despite the presence of NATO and 
coalition forces, as well as massive infusions of aid, Afghanistan has become the largest 
producer of heroin in the world and a perpetual nightmare of violence, and a bedrock for 
terrorism and criminal activity. Henceforth, it is of the essence to properly address this 




                                                           
10 Ghani, p. 5 
11 Rennie, Ruth. State building, security, and social change in Afghanistan, Reflections on a Survey of the 
Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, Kabul, Afghanistan. p. 17 




Research questions will touch upon 
 The following are a set of questions I would like to concentrate on in my research. 
What does nation-building mean for Afghanistan, and what needs to be done after 9 years 
of trying? What are the lessons learned in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and how is it 
possible to repair the failure of these previous reconstruction strategies? What should the 
United States do in order to promote a sustainable nation-building plan?  Is it the United 
States’ or NATO’s responsibility to rebuild a post-conflict nation regardless of what their 
role was in the 2001 invasion? 
 Would the nation-building lessons learned in Afghanistan be helpful in other 
failed states in the world such as Somalia? What strategic theory can tell us about the 
“successes” and “failures” of NATO and the U.S? Are the failures seen in Afghanistan 
due to the Iraq invasion?  
What needs to be done by different organizations in Afghanistan, UN, Red Cross, NGO, 
and NATO? What do different scholars say about how to operate in nation building in 
Afghanistan? What are some of the best resolutions to the problem that Afghanistan is 
presently facing? How could we overcome poverty and instability in Afghanistan? And 
how can we apply various international relations theories to answering such questions 








Identifying the problem and Approaches to solving it: 
 
 As the nation-building experiment in Afghanistan approaches its ninth year, 
progress remains with very mixed results. Until recently, the lessons to be learned have 
been mostly negative, but important policy adjustments along the way, especially those 
made by the United States reveal a picture that is more positive.13 Although serious 
challenges remain, tremendous successes have been achieved across the whole spectrum 
of nation-building efforts, from security and humanitarian relief to physical and economic 
reconstruction and state building. Both the successes and the failures merit careful 
analysis. But success is far from certain. Serious challenges remain, that if inequitably 
met, could cause the whole project of Afghan nation-building to founder. 
  We all agree that global poverty is intolerable; we attempt to deal with it by using 
mechanisms developed fifty years ago that result only in disenchantment and mutual 
recrimination without many significant breakthroughs in wealth creation. In addition, 
there are very few Afghan specialists within the U.S government after the American 
disengagement from the region following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
1989. How can an effective political strategy, be developed in the absence of country 
expertise? 
 Nevertheless, some dedicated NGOs remained on the ground after the US 
withdrawal in 1989. New strategic mechanisms that have been developed by these 
different dedicated NGOs need to be taken more seriously and given a chance to be 
applied. On the other hand some business NGOs were often required to cater to the 
                                                           
13 Fukuyama, F. ed. Michele A. Flournoy, Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, The Johns Hopkins University 




desires of local commanders, who used them for support within their patronage network. 
These practices often led to poor resource distribution and outright corruption.14 Many 
NGOs were not accountable, which resulted in subterfuge by some widespread distrust 
by many.  In the coming years the arrival of new and inexperienced organizations led to 
violent incidents and wasted resources. Their operations contradicted either national or 
local strategies for political reconstruction, they needed to be less biased and needed to 
include the local people in their procedures. Registering NGOs is a first step; fostering a 
code of conduct for operations in Afghanistan can also help.15 But there are dangers in 
actually requiring NGOs to be licensed for their activities, which can either unnecessarily 
limit good works or turn licensing into a new form of corruption for authorizing 
officers.16 There is a balance to be struck between the need for operational space for 
effectiveness and accountability to ensure legitimacy of action.17 
 I believe that in order for Afghanistan to undergo successful nation-building, 
several significant challenges would need to be met. These would be the provision of 
security, relief of displaced populations, rehabilitation of the economy and accompanying 
reconstruction of infrastructure, and state-building. Another major impediment to 
Afghanistan’s developmental and reconstruction program is related to its imposed politics 
and a lack of preparation and understanding of both Afghanistan and international actors, 
mostly the United States. The United States had no clear strategy for long-term 
stabilization, state building and development, which caused tremendous delays and are 
now pressing challenges to recapture the wasted time and resources. Also, Afghanistan 
                                                           
14 Their, Alexander. Chopra, Jarat. The Road Ahead , Political and institutional reconstruction of 
Afghanistan,  Third World Quarterly, Vol 23, No 5, p. 897 
15 Ibid. p. 897 
16 Ibid. p. 897 
17 Ibid. p. 899 
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was a target and concern within the context of counterterrorism, not humanitarianism.18  
It is commonly known that security and reconstruction are two sides of the same coin. 
Mutually reinforcing progress on one front is necessary on the other and therefore the 
first priority should be to bring security to the everyday lives of Afghans. Afghan people 
cannot put their lives on hold until the U.S is done capturing Al-Qaeda group leaders 
according to its counterterrorism program.  This creates impatience and problems, 
because some desperate farmers or young unemployed civilians are being tempted to join 
the Taliban who pay them. Since they are not presented with another alternative, and they 
have to make ends meet, they are inclined to join. Therefore, it is of imperative 
importance to have reconstruction and security work in unison. 
 Early strategic mistakes shaped Afghanistan on the ground and constrained later 
choices. Deep flaws in U.S strategy also occurred due to institutional incapacity within 
the U.S government for nation-building, and the George Bush administration’s initial 
reluctance to make nation-building in Afghanistan a priority. The United States think 
tank RAND calculated that a minimum investment of $100 per capita is needed to 
stabilize a country coming out of conflict. Bosnia received $ 679 per capita, Kosovo 
$576, and East Timor $233, Afghanistan received only $ 57 per capita in the first two 
years after 2001.19  
There is also a need to work on persuading other countries to assume more 
significant roles despite continued rifts between them, mostly by the Chinese government 
who neighbors Afghanistan to its north. There is a lot of developmental opportunity that 
                                                           
18 Ayub, Fatima. Kouvo, Sari, Righting the course? Humanitarian intervention, the war on terror and the 
future of Afghanistan, International Affairs, 84:4, p. 641.  
19 Report of the High-level panel set up by UN secretary-general, “Threats, Challenges and Changes,” 
December 2004, p, 183 
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both sides could take advantage of, e.g. Afghanistan hosts a profitable network of 
international trade routes. The legendary Karakoram highway that links China and 
Pakistan could pierce through the mighty Hindu Kush.20 There is an urgent need to 
rebuild key roads between the major cities and link them to neighboring countries so that 
aid would flow. Roads and railways of Afghanistan could greatly facilitate trade among 
the countries of central, west and south Asia, and far beyond and they can promote 
ancillary industries. Upon the foundation of a sound economy will arise a superstructure 
of polity and society.21  
 The Afghan economy is based on its agriculture; therefore, it is understandable 
that a good crop cycle would revive public morale in the countryside and convince people 
of the worthlessness of the Taliban. Millions of returning refugees would be encouraged 
to return to their villages rather than gravitate to the cities looking for work. Agriculture 
would provide jobs to the militiamen who would soon be demobilized and offer farmers 
alternatives to growing opium poppies, a business that was certain to boom again.22 
 Another setback to combat poverty is the tardiness in financial support by the 
international community; since the Afghanistan economy is fragile it needs a steady 
injection of money. However, many countries have failing aid bureaucracies that took 
months to identify projects, more months to disburse the money, and then had nobody on 
the ground to monitor implementation. The United States was blighted with the same 
problems, where at the end of the war the CIA, U.S Department of Defense (DOD), U.S 
Special Operation Force, the State Department, and USAID, were carrying out quick-
                                                           
20 Sau, Ranjit, Reconstruction of Afghanistan into a Modern Nation, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
37, No.2 (Jan.12-18, 2002), p. 120. 
21 Ibid. p. 120 
22 Rashid. p. 190 
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impact projects and humanitarian relief all with their separate budgets and staff. There 
was no central aid coordinator for the U.S government’s efforts and zero coordination 
with the U.N, European allies, or the Afghan government. Quick-impact projects were 
swift and cheap, such as digging a well, rebuilding a small bridge, or repairing a broken-
down school building and were supposed to convince the population that reconstruction 
was moving ahead.  All Western donors speak of “building capacity” in the weak Afghan 
government.23 In a failed state such as Afghanistan, capacity would take years of patience 
and hard work to build. In the meantime, donors undermined their own efforts by funding 
programs that would benefit the population without consulting the relevant ministry for 
their aid. It was tempting to do it yourself rather than spend years training Afghan 
officials.24 As we have observed, this will lead to more complicated problems as many 
Afghans get armed (police) or equipped without knowing how to operate as an 
institution, allowing other institutions, such as the Taliban, to take advantage and control 
the lack of proper governmental institutions.  
 The issue of funding was addressed in a major donor’s conference for 
Afghanistan that took place in Tokyo.  The donors concluded that it would take $ 12.2 
billion over five years to “rebuild” Afghanistan.25 A trust fund was established, but 
donors did not give in any money. In the next two years most of the funds pledged at 
Tokyo were to be spent on humanitarian relief rather then real reconstruction projects.26 
The United States said it would take the lead in building the new army; Britain would 
take charge of counter-narcotics; Italy would rebuild the justice system; Japan would 
                                                           
23 Rashid, p. 177 
24 Ibid. 




disarm the militias; while Germany would rebuild the police force.27 Their plans 
floundered due to lack of coordination, overlapping projects, and resulted in a waste of 
funds.  
 Also the U.S and U.N needed to settle ground on who is going to do what and 
keep to their pledges. Due to the fact that important programs needed to be delicately 
dealt with through coordination, it was key to maintain proper coordination, however that 
failed. For example, in a program called Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR), UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) was 
responsible for collecting heavy weapons from the warlords, such as tanks and artillery 
and prepared for disarming some one hundred thousand militias.28 DDR programs have 
become an essential part of peacemaking and nation building around the world, but the 
United States put up major obstacles, refusing to fund or support DDR or allow U.S 
troops to help the UN carry out disarmament.29 On the other hand, Lakhdar Brahimi 
(Special Adviser to the Secretary-General) stressed that training the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) had to run parallel to disarming the militias but the pentagon refused to 
help in this task.30 The United States however was recruiting militiamen to protect its 
bases, thereby increasing militia numbers even as the UN was trying to disarm them, 
henceforth, leading to an obstruction in achieving disarmament.31  
 The United States and a few other countries did take serious responsibility 
towards the new Afghan army, with expenditures on the ANA for 2004 at $797 million 
which rose to $830 million in 2005-2006. ANA then numbered 37, 000 men and with the 
                                                           
27 Rashid. p. 179 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. p. 205 
30 Ibid. p. 202 
31 Ibid. p. 205 
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help of NATO was able to deploy counter insurgencies in major Taliban areas. Today the 
major issue is how to sustain the army, which at full strength will have a recurrent cost of 
$1billion a year.32  
 Training a police force proved to be far more cumbersome. The UN had 
determined that rebuilding the police force in a failed states is even more important that 
rebuilding an army.33 The police are on the front line of public security, law and order 
and extending the writ of government.34 The Afghan national police was not rebuilt from 
scratch as the army was and the government recruited corrupt police officers from the 
warlords.35 The Germans who were tasked with training a new Afghan police force were 
unwilling to provide sufficient resources and training at which point Washington decided 
to take over police training in 2003, with interminable delays. The State Department had 
given DynCorp $24 million to set up seven regional training centers across Afghanistan. 
DynCorp was training the police to fight an insurgency rather than win hearts and minds 
in their localities.36  
In short, my policy proposals are:  1) attention must be made to the proposals and 
plans of NGOs who were present in Afghanistan prior to the US invasion. 2) Focus needs 
to be on re-building Afghanistan’s economy, security forces and the reconstruction of its 
infrastructure. Of key importance is to rebuild its roads and rail infrastructure so that 
trade could be facilitated between neighboring countries. 3) Encouragement of other 
neighboring countries, in particular, China to invest in Afghanistan’s development. 
                                                           
32 Rashid. p. 205 
33 Ibid. p. 206 
34 Ibid. p. 206 
35 Reforming the Afghan National Police, A joint report of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense 
and Security Studies (London) and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia), 2005, p, 36 
36 Rashid. p. 205 
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4) Facilitation of farmers and Afghani agriculture with the needs to produce viable 
products instead of opium. 5) Investment by the broader international community should 
include more resources and money into Afghan development projects. 6) Most 
importantly, the creation of a coordination center where Afghan officials, the United 
Nations and all other multinational organizations and NGOs could supervise, coordinate 
and decide on important development projects that will affect the country on both the 
national and local level. 
 
 Methodology for solving the development issue: 
 
 The primary objective of this research is to identify and better understand key 
issues affecting state-building interventions and their implications for current and future 
governance programming. The objective is to learn how governance works in 
Afghanistan’s fragmented society, as well as how it is changing in response to 
programmatic interventions supported by the international community.  The design of 
this research is aimed to identifying key issues in Afghanistan development program with 
particular focus on changes taking place in relation to state-building intervention such as 
the establishment of Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), the Priority Reform 
and Restructuring (PRR) including the Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP) and 
other United Nation and Red Cross Development process. The research objectives of 
exploring key issues in Afghanistan development program context called for a primarily 
qualitative methodology. I will use a combination of methods but most specifically the 
qualitative tools used in this research include semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
oral histories, subject biographies, and journalists accounts (media monitoring). I will 
18 
 
primarily rely on what is already written and analyze it according to my hypothesis, and 
fill the gap of different research studies. The research will mainly focus on secondary 
sources, however efforts will be put into use primary sources. My research focuses on the 
rural but also urban society of Afghanistan, the intention is to compare and contrast the 





















Chapter 1: Review of the Relevant Literature 
 The topic of development in Afghanistan has drawn a wealth of critique and 
debate over what should be done in order to rejuvenate the economy, eliminate poverty, 
and how to improve progress to its full potential. In order to properly assess the 
development of Afghanistan, I will use the UNDP’s human development indices that 
analyze a country’s development base on a specific set of criteria. I won’t be focusing on 
all of the aspects but the ones, which have affected and plagued the afghan people. I will 
focus on the following criteria: 1) Economy, inequality and poverty. 2) Public health.  
The articles, books, UN organization developmental programs that will be covered in this 
literature review are in the order of: 
1) A World Bank Country Study, Afghanistan—State Building, Sustaining Growth, and 
Reducing Poverty, 2) The Human Development Index Report (2010), 3) Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy (2008-2013) A Strategy for Security, Growth and 
Poverty Reduction,4) Country Cooperation Strategy for WHO and Afghanistan, 5) David 
Shams “Democracy’s Dilemma, The Challenges to State Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” 6) 
Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos, The U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Central Asia,” 7) Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart “Fixing Failed States, A 
framework for rebuilding a fractured world,”  8)John D. Montgomery and Dennis A. 
Rondinelli “ Beyond Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” 9) Francis Fukuyama “Nation-
building, Beyond Afghanistan, and Iraq,” 10) Building On Early Gains in Afghanistan’s 
Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector,” 11) UNAMA),12) UNODC & UNDCP, 13)  
AIHRC and AIHRC Social and Economic . 
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 The two major sources of primary statistical data for this analysis are the World 
Bank’s World Development Reports from the years relevant to this study and the United 
Nations’ Human Development Reports from analogous years. The World Bank’s annual 
World Development Report assesses the current economic, social and environmental 
state of all countries. Each yearly report focuses on a different aspect of development that 
is explored in depth. Each report also tracks common key economic indicators, such as 
Gross National Product, External Debt, Official Development Assistance and Average 
Annual Growth that are common to all reports. These numbers will provide the basis for 
the quantitative analysis of economic development in Afghanistan. The most recent 
report, includes figures that indicate how wealth is distributed within Afghanistan and 
illustrates what part of the population is the beneficiary of development. The report 
observes the equity of opportunity for all members within a society. A more human focus 
is equally important to this thesis and so some additional figures, like the percent of the 
population living on less than one dollar a day, which is considered below the global 
poverty level, are used from this report but are not always available for all years.   
 
 When it comes to the economy, the World Bank country study holds a good grasp 
of the situation in Afghanistan’s economy. In its 2004 report of the countries economic 
situation, it explains the progression of Afghanistan’s economy since the fall of the 
Taliban. It provides a description and analysis of the Afghan economy and recent 
performance based on available quantitative data and qualitative information. It also 
reviews the state of the economy at the end of the conflict and, it discusses Afghanistan’s 
strong growth performance. Two-thirds came from agriculture, thanks mainly to better 
21 
 
precipitation, and better availability of seeds and fertilizers. Other drivers behind it are 
that cereal output has strongly recovered, but opium production also has rebounded. 
Services are booming, mainly in major cities, in construction, and in the public sector, 
linked to the reconstruction effort. A strong sign of improved confidence, 2.4 million 
refugees have come back to Afghanistan, and 600,000 internally displaced people have 
returned to their homes.37 The World Bank also outlines the structures of the Afghan 
economy, with an emphasis on the informal economy and its linkages with conflict and 
insecurity. It is inherently difficult to estimate the size of the informal economy, except in 
sectors where it is dominant like agriculture and narcotics. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
some 80-90 percent of economic activity in Afghanistan occurs in the informal sector, 
which has been largely responsible for the recent economic recovery and dynamism.38 
The World Bank report shows the prospects for growth and areas of growth potential for 
Afghanistan regarding sustained long-term economic growth, ranging from agricultural 
production and processing to mining, construction, trade, and other services.39  
 The Human Development Report, an annual report published by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), also includes key economic developmental 
indicators, however, it puts a greater emphasis on human and social criteria like access to 
safe water sources, health services, life expectancy and maternal mortality rates. This 
data complements the World Development Report data as it focuses more precisely on 
improvements in the human sector. The development of human and social criteria like 
level of education, access to sanitation and infant mortality rates will be analyzed along 
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with economic data to determine what type of development took place and if it will be 
lasting, superficial, or nationwide. The concept of human development focuses on human 
opportunity and human freedom. The goal of human development is that all humans be 
afforded the same conditions that allow them to lead productive and prosperous lives. 
Scholars and practitioners who study human development assess long-term development 
issues rather that only immediate economic income-related development. The Human 
Development Index, formulated by the UN and outlined in the Human Development 
Report, rates the expectancy, education as measured by literacy, and a decent standard of 
living as represented by level of per capita income. Although the report highlights the 
importance of human development it concedes that human development does not 
necessarily affect economic growth.40 A rise in human development does not necessarily 
imply economic growth, and similarly, a rise in economic growth as indicated by 
macroeconomic indicators, does not necessarily mean improvement in the human and 
social domains.41  
 The UNDP Afghanistan program, is guided by the requirements set forth in the 
National Development Framework (NDP), UNDP Afghanistan focuses its activities on 
the following UNDP global practice areas: poverty reduction, democratic governance and 
crisis prevention and recovery.  All of UNDP’s activities take place under the leadership 
of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and in close collaboration with 
ministries, agencies, and donors leading programs within the consultative group equality 
in Afghanistan, ensuring that gender issues are consistently mainstreamed and carefully 
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paced.42 All UNDP program activities aim to consolidate peace, enhance security and 
promote respect for the rule of law. In addition to direct support to the national security 
sector, UNDP projects enhance the government institutional capacity to provide public 
services and to create an enabling environment for legitimate livelihoods.43  
 The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013, A Strategy for 
Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction) has conducted a wide 
range of research and survey on this important link between Security, Governance, 
Economic Growth and Poverty that all effect in a certain way the degree of progress it 
could have in the development process of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) represents the combined efforts of the Afghan people and 
the Afghan Government with the support of the international community to address the 
major challenges facing the country. To comprehensively address the security, 
governance, and development needs of Afghanistan, the government has developed the 
ANDS. The ANDS reflects the government’s vision, principles and goals for 
Afghanistan, which builds on its commitment to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals by 2020 and the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. The 
Strategy is based upon an assessment of current social and economic conditions; offers 
clear intermediate objectives; and identifies the actions that must be taken to achieve 
these national goals. The ANDS largely focuses on five years (2008-2013), but reflects 
Afghanistan’s long-term goals, which include the elimination of poverty through the 
emergence of a vibrant middle class, an efficient and stable democratic political 
environment and security throughout the country. A comprehensive “bottom up” 
                                                           
42 UNDP Afghanistan State-Building & Government Support Program, Afghanistan Country Office 
December 2008 p, 110 
43 Ibid. p. 3 
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approach was used in the development of the ANDS that has taken into account all 
aspects of social and economic life as well as aspects of social and economic life as well 
as fully reflecting the diversity of people in all parts of the country.44 Considerable efforts 
were made to ensure that sub national consultations (i.e., outside of central government in 
the capital Kabul) identified the priorities of the Afghan people living in each of the 34 
provinces.45 The ANDS is the product of extensive consultations and the national, 
provincial and local levels. Most of my interviewee data will derive from this study. In 
order to take on the challenge of poverty reduction and underpin the development of the 
Government’s poverty reduction strategy, it is essential to understand poverty, its 
dimensions, characteristics, and determinants. According to ANDS 2008 survey data, 
while far from perfect, permits a preliminary analysis of urban and rural poverty in 
Afghanistan.46  
 
 Information on the specific nature of poverty in Afghanistan is restricted by the 
considerable quality and quantity limitations, with National Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessment (NRVA) comprising the majority of information available. These have been 
based on limited household surveys. The 2005 NRVA covered approximately 31,000 
households, allowing national and provincial poverty rates to be assessed. While the 2005 
NRVA survey was a substantial improvement on previous studies, it also has several 
weaknesses with only one season being covered. To overcome this, separate survey 
conducted in spring 2007. Ongoing data collection includes the planned 2007/2008 
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NRVA survey (predominantly funded by the European Commission). This study will 
cover all seasons and the consumption module includes assessment of more food items 
and non-food items. Moreover, stronger emphasis has been placed on survey design and 
the collection and computation of high quality of data.  
 
  Much of the literature that addresses the progress of development in Afghanistan 
touches upon the major advances of the health system is availability to its people and the 
progress this system has made in this specific field. In Building on Early Gains in 
Afghanistan’s Health, Nutrition, and population Sector: Challenges and Options, Tekabe 
A.Belay describes Afghanistan’s health system as functioning quite poorly until late 
2001.47 There was little coverage of preventive and curative health services for a number 
of reasons. The prolonged civil war, the shortage of staff in rural areas, and the absence 
of explicitly articulated national priorities all resulted in limited availability and quality of 
services. Coverage of services such as skilled birth attendance, antennal care, and 
vaccination was very low, with severe consequences for health outcomes.48  In 2001, the 
infant mortality rate (IMR) was estimated at 165 per 1,000 live births, and the under-five 
mortality rate (U5MR) was estimated at 257 per 1,000 live births.49 The maternal 
mortality ratio was as high as 6,507 per 100,000 in some parts of the country. 
Afghanistan’s health sector has come a long way since 2002.50 A number of development 
partners, especially the World Bank, the European Union, and the U.S Agency for 
International Development (USAID), have been key supporters of the government of 
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Afghanistan’s effort to rebuild and strengthen the health sector. Together the three donors 
invested more than $820 million between 2003/04 and 2008/09 and played key roles in 
helping the government reshape the health sector.51 This support continues, with all 
partners starting new projects aimed at further strengthening the sector and building on 
the successes that have been achieved. In the book Building on Early Gains in 
Afghanistan’s health, Nutrition and Population sector it aims to document the 
achievements in rebuilding Afghanistan’s health system over the period 2002-08; 
contribute to the development of a set of practical policy options that will further increase 
the quality, availability and use of health services by the poor and other vulnerable 
groups, provide policy options for the MOPH as it defines its future role in the sector; 
and suggest how the development partners can best support the efforts of the government. 
It focuses on practical issues and examines a number of policies that are feasible to 
implement. 
 WHO, Country Cooperation strategy for WHO and Afghanistan addresses the 
current challenges in trying to develop health system policy in Afghanistan. Since the 
beginning of 2002 the ministry of Public Health has made significant progress in charting 
the direction of the health sector for the medium term. It has formulated a clear and well-
defined national health policy for 2005-2009 and a national health strategy for 2005-
2006. The three broad elements of health policy aim at: implementing health services 
(BPHS), the essential package of hospital services (EPHS) and the establishment of 
prevention and promotion programs; reducing morbidity and mortality by improving the 
quality of maternal and reproductive health and the quality of child health initiatives; and 
building institutional capacities through the promotion of institutional and management 




development, strengthening human resources, especially of female staff, and 
strengthening health planning, monitoring and evaluation at all levels of health care.52  
Some of the major health development challenges include: abysmally high maternal, 
infant and under-five mortality rates; widespread nutritional deficiency associated with 
food insecurity, made worst by the recent drought; high incidence of communicable 
disease, notably malaria and tuberculosis; poorly developed health infrastructure; security 
concerns and lack of communication infrastructure which further limits access to health 
care, and extreme shortage of trained health human resources, especially at mid level, and 
female health workers of all categories. 53  
 
 The WHO Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS) is a reference framework at the 
country level for WHOs cooperation with Afghanistan for the next four years for use to 
improve the country’s health sector performance. In developing the CCS, the country’s 
needs and expectations are considered within the regional and global priorities of WHO. 
The key principles governing WHO’s quest for a new strategic agenda at the country 
level are54:  
-Greater focus on those programs where WHO has the greatest relative advantage 
- More emphasis on WHO’s role as policy adviser 
- Wider partnerships and greater attention to partners’ strategies and activities 
- Maintenance of the visibility and credibility of WHO and differentiation of WHO’s 
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- Guidance for achieving the health sector-related Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).  
 
 David Sham’s paper “Democracy’s Dilemma, The challenges to State Legitimacy 
in Afghanistan” notes that there are three main elements to hinder the process of 
reconstruction and reform, as well as the formation of a legitimate state in Afghanistan: 
human rights violations, institutional corruption, and drug cultivation and trade.55 All 
three elements have stemmed from the methods and the policies that the state has 
assumed in an effort to succeed in the reconciliatory process with the warring factions. 
The state has taken these measures to prevent the recurrence of another armed conflict 
between the state and the warlords, which could easily lead to chaos and political 
destabilization throughout the country. Analysis and assessment by political scientists are 
not only sources that point to the obscurity of issues that the Afghan state has to face in 
order to achieve legitimacy among the Afghans, and to protect its territorial and political 
sovereignty.56 David shams brings helpful data in assessing the gravity and 
comprehending the intricacy of various social, political and economic matters in 
Afghanistan.57 In 2006, when President Karzai openly admitted to its institutional 
corruption, he also said that many state officials benefit from the well-developed illegal 
drug industry. The public’s perception matches President Karzai’s observation. The 
involvement of civil servants in drug trade has created serious impediments on the path of 
the Afghan state and the international community’s war against drugs. Drugs and 
corruption are two different, and yet intertwined issues that have posed great challenges 
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to the creation of a sovereign and legitimate state in Afghanistan. The problem of a 
complex unlawful drug economy and the deep penetration of those who play crucial role 
in its cultivation and trade within the state’s various institutional structures 
collaboratively reinforce each other.58 This reality threatens to transform Afghanistan 
from a democratic to narco-state, and weaken the institutional organization of the 
government. Therefore, the public is unhappy and suspicious of a government perceived 
as under the control and in service of the corrupt officials/warlords. The lack of capacity 
on part of the state in implementing law, and in providing sufficient security and other 
social services has also spoiled the perception of the state as a sovereign entity in the eyes 
of the Afghans.  
 Clearly, utilizing a combination of granted political power and large sums of 
drug-dollar, corrupt state officials have skillfully placed themselves in a position above 
the law, which in turn, has severely damaged the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. 
This is evident in numerous media stories from Afghanistan, in which the participation of 
warlords in drug trade (as prominent state employees) is the central theme. These reports 
mainly focus on the involvement of chiefs of police, governors, and even ministers in 
drug trade and other illegal activities.59 The accused officials have failed to serve the 
public giving priority to their own self-interest at the expense of the public’s social, 
political, and economic welfare. Largely, this reality is the result of a joint policy 
embraced by the Afghan and the U.S decision makers. They have chosen to reward 
warlords in return for their collaboration in the war on terror.60 The strategy of appeasing 
                                                           





warlords comes in direct clash with the state and the international community’s 
objectives of eradicating drugs and corruption in Afghanistan.  
 
 Offering a qualitative critique of development and state-building in the aftermath 
of the Afghanistan invasion, Ahmed Rashid warns of an inefficient and lack of 
cooperation among international organization, NGOs and the U.S as its predominant 
actor in its development of Afghanistan. In the third and ninth chapter of his book, 
Descent into Chaos, the U.S and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, 
and the Failure of National Building, Rashid divulgates a series of assembled verified 
failure incidents that have not only deteriorated Afghanistan development but have 
increased the corruption and insecurity in Afghanistan. This book shows how the United 
States ignored consolidating South and Central Asia – the homeland of global 
terrorism—in favor of invading Iraq. American resources and military manpower that 
Afghanistan should have received went to Iraq. “Iraq was more than just a major 
distraction to Afghanistan,” says Kofi Annan in retrospect. “Huge resources were 
devoted to Iraq, which focused away from nation building in Afghanistan. The billions 
spend in Iraq were the billions that were not spend in Afghanistan.”61 Moreover, the U.S 
attack on Iraq was critical to convincing Musharraf that the United States was not serious 
about stabilizing the region, and that it was safer for Pakistan to preserve its own national 
interest by clandestinely giving the Taliban refuge. First Afghanistan and then in Iraq, not 
enough U.S troops were deployed, nor were enough planning and resources devoted to 
the immediate postwar resuscitation of people’s lives. There was no coherence to U.S 
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tactics and strategy, which led to vitally wrong decisions being taken at critical 
moments—whether it was reviving the warlords in Afghanistan or dismantling the army 
and bureaucracy in Iraq. This book is about American failure to secure the region after 
9/11, to carry out nation building on a scale that could have reversed the appeal of 
terrorism and Islamic extremism and averted state collapse on a more calamitous scale 
than could ever have happened before 9/11. Bank estimates that there are now twenty-six 
failing states in the world that could breed terrorism, as opposed to seventeen such states 
in 2003. Clearly, we have gotten a great deal wrong about the post—9/11 world.62  This 
book is an attempt to frame events and their consequences across the largest landmass in 
the world, and to show what went wrong on the ground and why, while describing how 
such poor decisions were made in Washington. It tries to answer the question of why the 
world is less secure seven nine years after 9/11. 
 
 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, through an analysis of state-building efforts in 
failed states, critique the way the West strategy to help develop the country of the 3rd 
world isn’t working and new personalized strategies need to be implemented. In their 
book, the Fixing Failed States, A frame work for rebuilding a fractured world, they argue 
for a reorientation in the international response to create capable states. The key to state 
building is first to agree on a goal and functions of the state to support this objective and 
then to follow up with a pragmatic search for means of implementation.63 Therefore, the 
book proposes a strategic framework for defining the functions of the state, designing the 
organizational structure necessary for the performance of those functions, and aligning 
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actors to the goal of state building. It presents ideas for recognizing international security 
so that political and economic organizations can serve the purpose of creating and 
sustaining effective states. When applied to a specific context, our framework translates 
into a strategic map for understanding the strengths and weakness of individual functions. 
On this basis, specific strategies can then be devised that are tailored to context and deal 
with the issue of sequencing in a systemic way. Strategies would be cemented through 
“double compacts: between country leadership and the international community on the 
one hand and the citizenry on the other”.64 Finally the book purposes methods for 
comparative reporting on state capacity in the form of a “sovereignty index” that would 
be presented each year to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to the annual 
meetings of the World Bank.65 This framework argues for a citizen-based approach to 
state building: a new legal compact between citizen, state and the market, not a top-down 
imposition of the state. The forty-sixty states now in crisis cannot follow Europe’s path to 
state formation from the sixteenth to the twentieth century.66 While the legitimate use of 
force is an important criterion in defining states, it is no longer the sole criterion. Our task 
is to establish legitimate states at a time when the use of force has reached its limit. States 
now derive their legitimacy from performing specific functions in the economic, social 
and political domains. Even if it were desirable, it is neither credible nor feasible to 
impose order from the top down. Rather, the solution must come through establishing 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community and a country’s citizens. It does not 
make sense to conceive of sovereignty as an untrammeled right, divorced from 
obligations both to the population governed and to the international community of states. 
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This principle—that the rights of sovereignty also entail obligations—is fundamental to 
the legitimacy of states and therefore to their ability to close the de facto gap in their 
sovereign capacities.67  
 
 John Montgomery and Rondinelli also provide qualitative support in favor of 
changing the way developmental strategies have been structured. They unfold lessons of 
experience on which donors can draw in implementing plan for reconstruction and 
development in Afghanistan. Some reveal successful policies that can be modified and 
adapted to Afghanistan’s condition and needs, and others are derived from less successful 
programs and mistakes that donors can avoid. None of the successful programs of the 
past can be extended to Afghanistan without considering the condition of success, and 
some may not be replicable at all. It is certain, however that policies that are informed by 
knowledge and understanding of the past offer better prospects of success than those who 
merely respond to immediate needs, however urgent. 
 
 The issue of consent, which Francis Fukuyama, describes as “Nation-building, 
Reconstruction versus development” challenges the UN developmental programs today. 
Nation-building may be examined from two different types of activities, reconstruction 
and development. Although the distinction between the two is often blurred, it was 
always present to nation-builders of earlier generations dealing with post-conflict 
situations. Reconstruction refers to the restoration of war-torn or damaged societies to 
their preconflict situation. Development, however, refers to the creation of new 
institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the 
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society openendedly into something that it has not been previously.68 There is a huge 
conceptual difference between reconstruction and development. Reconstruction is 
something that outside powers have shown themselves historically able to bring about.  
Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social infrastructure has 
survived conflict or crisis or crisis: the problem is then the relatively simple matter of 
injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying food, 
roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like.69 Development however, is much more 
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Chapter 2: Mission Mandates and Descriptions 
UNAMA—United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
 
  The UN intervention in Afghanistan was designed to assist the Afghan people in 
laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development but also to help end the 
violent conflict, insurgency and terrorism. UNAMA’s program, mandates and 
description, has the lead role in coordinating the operational activities of UN institutions, 
including their support to consultative group and national activities budget processes. 
UNDP helped the interim Government of Afghanistan to establish an Aid Coordination 
Unit and Public information Unit within the Afghan Assistance Coordination Agency. 
The Aid Coordination Unit created a donor assistance database to respond to the need for 
a donor tracking system, identified in the NDF.70 UNAMA has special responsibilities in 
the areas of national reconciliation (supporting the work of the Special Commission on 
the Emergency Loya Jirga, recently completed); human rights (monitoring, reporting, 
investigating violations and recommending corrective action); rule of law (supporting the 
Judicial Commission established by the Bonn Agreement); the role of women (supporting 
women’s rights and participation in society); and humanitarian affairs (coordinating U.N. 
relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts within the U.N. system and with the Afghan 
Interim – and now the Transitional – Authority).71 In Resolution 1401, the Security 
Council requested that ISAF work in close consultation with the Secretary General and 
SRSG Brahimi, and urged bilateral and multilateral donors to coordinate their activities 
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closely with SRSG Brahimi and the Afghan Interim Administration and its successors, 
through the Afghanistan Support Group (a development aid and assistance coordinating 
body created in 1997 by the fifteen largest donors to Afghanistan and the European 
Union)72 and the Implementation Group (the reconstruction aid and implementation 
group co-chaired by the Afghan Interim and now Transitional Authority and World Bank, 
which meets regularly to coordinate reconstruction efforts, bringing together 
representatives of the international community and bilateral donors).73  The Council 
likewise called on all Afghan parties to cooperate with UNAMA in the implementation of 
its mandate and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its staff throughout 
the country.  
Tasks of UNAMA’s Two Pillars 
 Political Affairs74  
a. Monitor, analyze and report on overall political and human rights situation and status of Bonn  
Agreement implementation, especially regarding environment for emergency loya jirga;  
b. Support the work of the Special Independent Commission of the emergency loya jirga;  
c. Maintain contact with Afghan leaders, political parties, civil society groups, institutions and 
representatives of central authorities;  
d. Maintain contact with representatives of international community;  
e. Perform good offices as necessary on behalf of SRSG and in support of efforts of the Afghan 
authorities (especially in the areas of conflict control, confidence-building and reconciliation);  
f. Provide information and guidance on political issues for the benefit of other UNAMA 
activities;  
g. Investigate human rights violations and, where necessary, recommend corrective action.  
  
Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction75  
a. Articulate strategic vision for U.N. assistance role in Afghanistan that responds to immediate 
needs of most vulnerable populations, supports national recovery and reconstruction priorities, 
and is rights-based and gender-sensitive;  
b. Develop an integrated U.N. assistance program that builds on the comparative advantages, 
capacities, experience and mandates of the U.N. assistance community to monitor performance 
and to ensure accountability against established standards of performance, with special attention 
to measures promoting women’s rights and the achievement of rights of the most disadvantaged 
and underserved populations and ethnic groups;  
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c. Ensure that U.N. assistance supports capacity-building in counterpart Afghan administrations 
and organizations at the national and sub-national levels to develop policy-making, planning, 
management, assessment and coordination abilities through technical, material and financial 
support to counterpart administrative departments;  
d. Create, with the Interim Administration and other partners, an effective program information 
and data management system that builds on the Afghanistan Information Management Service to 
provide necessary information, in a user-friendly form, on program coverage, performance and 
financing, through a range of communications channels, to actors at the national and sub-national 
levels and to donors and partners in the international community.  This facility would be a semi-
autonomous U.N.-funded facility, managed by a client board (Interim  
Authority, U.N., NGO and donor representation) co-located with the Afghanistan Assistance  
Coordination Authority;  
e. Ensure that national and sub-national activities of the U.N. offices, agencies, funds and 
programs are conducted efficiently, cost-effectively, in a coordinated manner and in cooperation 
with other actors – governmental, non-governmental, private sector and international – as 
appropriate;   
f. Assign, in agreement with the national administration, thematic and sectoral lead coordination 
responsibilities to the U.N. agencies, funds and programs, as appropriate to support counterpart 
departments to oversee and coordinate all actors – national and international – and activities in 
each sector, to ensure actions are coherent and responsive to needs;  
g. Oversee, guide and support regional relief, recovery and reconstruction coordinators in the 
regional UNAMA offices, enabling them to ensure coherent U.N. agency capacity-development 
support to local counterpart authorities and other partners to ensure cross-sectoral coordination;  
h. Represent U.N. assistance community to the international and donor communities, to ensure 
appropriate integrated reporting on the overall performance of the U.N. assistance community, to 
ensure timely reporting to the U.N. bodies as necessary, to mobilize resources for relief,  
 
 
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime  & 
UNDCP: United Nation International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 
 Both these programs are committed to the elimination of illicit crop cultivation in 
Afghanistan. A key component of these programs are the Afghanistan Annual Opium 
Poppy Survey published every year. These surveys are primarily a monitoring tool,which 
allows to: aim to provide information on the location and extent of poppy cultivation, and 
the key production and pricing statistics for raw opium gum. The information gathered by 
the survey leads to an understanding of the outcome of the past season, and the 
identification of trends in poppy cultivation. This information contributes to planning and 
resource allocation within UNDCP and UNODC, and other multilateral, bilateral, and 
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non-government agencies. National authorities are also increasingly using the survey to 
monitor domestic cultivation and production.76 
These surveys are a ground-based census that visits all villages that are known to have 
cultivated poppy in the past, or that have recently commenced poppy cultivation. The 
survey employs a large, well-trained team of Afghan nationals. Each team member 
completes a survey form with data concerning the village poppy area, yield and growing 
conditions. The survey also contributes to UNDCP’s Global Illicit Crops Monitoring 
Program.77 The objectives of this program are to define international core indicators on 
illicit crop cultivation, to establish uniform methodologies for data collection and 
analysis, to increase host government’s capacity to monitor and develop replacements to 
these illicit crops and to assist the international community in monitoring the extent and 
evolution of illicit crops in the context of the elimination strategy adopted by the 
member-states at the Special Session of the General Assembly in June 1998. 78 
 
AIHRC: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
Because of the need to build a new, democratic Afghan society, that respects human 
rights, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was written into the 
Bonn Agreement in December 2001. AIHRC was given the responsibility for developing 
a national plan of action for human rights in Afghanistan, including human rights 
monitoring and implementing of a national program of human rights education, 
undertaking national human right consultation and the development of domestic human 
rights institutions. The commission is required to submit opinions, recommendations, 
                                                           
76 Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010, Winter Rapid Assessment, UNODC 
77 Ibid. 
78 UNDCP, Annual Opium Poppy Survey, 2001 
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proposals, and reports to local, regional, and national authorities. It is also mandated to 
promote the harmonization of Afghan laws and practices with international human rights 
instruments to which Afghanistan is a party.  AIHRC is mandated to monitor the situation 
of human rights, where the liberty of people have been denied, restricted or violated in 
police custody detention centers, prisons, juvenile prisons, and other situations where 
human rights are vulnerable. The commission also monitors freedom of speech and the 
status of women and children. The AIHRC investigates specific complaints of human 
rights violations, involving abuses of authority and seeks remedies to end the abuses.  
Where violations and abuses of human rights are identified, the Commission has a 
mandate to take steps to protect and to promote human rights, including through 
advocacy and submission of reports to the Government. 
AIHRC also have a economic and Social Rights that I will be a concentrating on. The 
role of national human rights institutions in monitoring economic and social rights has 
been recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, in particular in 
conducting research to assess the extend to which these rights are being realized, either 
within the country as whole or for specific vulnerable group. The AIHR Social and 
economic rights emphasizes the role of national human rights institutions in ensuring that 
economic, social, and cultural rights are enforced and protected and to ensure that the 
Millennium Development Goals is consistent with state obligations under international 
human rights instruments. The main issues covered in this analysis will focus on: 
-­‐ The right to an adequate standard of living—household vulnerability; 
-­‐ The right to property and the right to adequate housing; 
-­‐ The right to water; 
-­‐ The right to health; 
-­‐ The right to education; 
-­‐ The right to participate in development; The right to an effective remedy; 
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Chapter 3: Analysis  
3.1 The Economic and Public Health context of Afghanistan 
 Almost a decade of civil war following the military conflict and intervention of 
the Soviet Union has left Afghanistan significantly destroyed. Since Afghanistan had no 
growth or negative growth, according to the Guimbert report the average growth was 
1960-1970 of 2 percent, and 3.6 percent for 1970-1978. From 1978-1990 Afghanistan’s 
real income level decreased 1.8 percent (i.e., negative GDP growth)79. With the Taliban 
dominating the political landscape from 1996 onwards, Afghanistan had been moving 
backwards in all aspects. The result of war, the destruction of core institutions of state 
and a heavily war ridden economy led to unrivaled levels of absolute poverty, large scale 
illiteracy, high human rights violations with no sense of security and rule of law and the 
almost complete disintegration of gender equality.  Based on Maddison (2001) and Penn, 
GDP growth was negative until mid-90s with a small recovery to then plummet again 
with further reductions until 200180. The 1998-2001 period also included a severe 
drought with a large impact on agriculture, the main economic activity until very 
recently.  
 Afghanistan’s post-2001economic conditions and post conflict recovery has been 
severely damaged or completely destroyed. The ravages of conflict have bestowed upon 




                                                           
79 Guimbert, S. (2004), ‘Structure and Performance of the Afghan Economy”, World Bank 
80 Maddison, A. (2001), ‘The World Economy: a Millennial Perspective’, OECD. 
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3.2.1. Economy and Reconstruction 
Afghanistan’s economic recovery from the fall of Taliban (2002-2003):  
 
 In 2002, the official (non-opium) GDP, starting from a very low base, grew 
dramatically by 29 percent in 2002 and by 16 percent in 2003. Economic activity has 
expanded rapidly as a consequence both of the post conflict recovery, a demand impulse 
based on donor financed spending (especially since 2004/2005) and drug money.  Two-
third’s of this growth came from agriculture, thanks mainly to better precipitation and 
better availability of seeds and fertilizers.81 Cereal output strongly recovered, but opium 
production also rebounded.82 Services are booming, mainly in major cities, in 
construction, and in the public sector, linked to the reconstruction effort. A strong sign of 
improved confidence, 2.4 million refugees have come back to Afghanistan, and 600,000 
internally displaced people have returned to their homes.83 The end of a major conflict, 
with associated revival of economic activity, and the end of the drought in many parts of 
the country, which brought sharp increase in agricultural production, is two key drivers of 
this dramatic economic recovery. Sound government policies, as well as structural 
reforms in certain areas, have supported the recovery.84  
 
In 2003, Afghanistan’s GPD is estimated at around $7 billion (including $2.3 billion of 
illicit opiate receipts)85.  From 2003 to 2006 a catch-up effect is fading out, growth in the 
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medium and long term depends to an ever greater extent upon improvements in 
governance and a successful integration into the world economy, while foreign aid will 
remain a key contributor. Private investment had consistently grown since 2002 and 
reached a peak in 2005/2006, reflecting untapped economic opportunities of the country 
and an improved macroeconomic stance.86  
 
 Legal economic activity has been stimulated by the large influx of international 
aid, accompanied by the return of many skilled people and businesspeople from the 
Afghan Diaspora, crowded in by the large reconstruction budget. A limited number of 
large foreign direct investments for example in the telecoms sector and other services 
have also contributed to growth and productivity. Exports (official) have been growing 
rapidly, more so than the real GDP (see Table 1), even if the country has developed no 
new export sectors outside the traditional sectors of carpets, minerals and horticultural 
products.87 Vulnerability to drought was responsible for lower GDP growth in 2006/07, 
although growth is expected to rise based on a post-drought rebound in agricultural 
production (see Table 1). Moreover, a large proportion of GDP is accounted for by 
foreign aid and assistance. Large inflows of aid, coupled with inflows of hard currency 
from the opium economy has led to a relative appreciation of the Afghani, and higher 
costs of labor and other inputs for Afghan producers, undermining the competitiveness of 
the manufacturing sector. However, the manufacturing sector has been able to keep up 
with the rest of the licit economy in terms of growth. Non tradable sectors in general have 
been growing more than the rest of the economy.  
                                                           




 Table 1 shows the GDP growth and per capita evolution since 2001. Except for 
the 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 drought-induced slowdown in agriculture the transitional 
economy has grown rapidly posting double-digit growth rates. The ADB reports growth 
in the 2007/2008 reached 13.9 percent (ADB, 2008). Assuming the externally financed 
development efforts are sustained and that climatic factors do not affect agricultural 
production, the economy is expected to grow between 8.4 and 9 percent during 
2008/2009 period (IMF, 2008a and ADB, 2008). But given the size of the informal 
economy these numbers appear to underestimate real economic performance (World 
Bank, 2005c). Accurate data is lacking but estimates of Afghanistan’s GDP per capita is 
$335 (IMF, 2008a) with an estimated 70% of the population living below the $2 a day 
poverty line (DFID, 2006). 
Table 1. Afghanistan, Real GDP (annual percentage change), Official exports 
(annual percentage change) and GDP per capita (US dollars) 




















GDP  28.6 15.1 9.4 16.4 6.1 13.5 9.0 9.0 8.0 
Official 




182 199 252 300 335 383 433 … … 
Source: IMF (2008a, 2008c) and WEO (2008) 
 
3.2.2 Investment: 
 According to Afghanistan’s Investment Support Agency (AISA), the licit 
investment peaked in 2006/07 driven by donor-funded government investment. However 
private investment declined in the same period, with 2005 marking the inflexion point. 
Also, the AISA reported a decline in the number of new business registrations in 
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2006/07. Similarly, the IMF (2008c) reports foreign direct investment reaching in 2005 a 
peak at 4.2 percent of GDP, reduced to 3.4 percent in 2006/07 and projected at 3.3 
percent until 2009. Based on AISA registrations, only services and construction seem to 
be attracting more investments, especially from within the country and by 2007, most 
sectors have not yet reached the 2005 level.  
 
Table 2. Total Number of companies registered with AISA (as of 
December 2007) 
Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total Number of 
companies 3.243 1.386 2.503 2.046 2.096 11.274 
Domestic 1.474 1.137 2.123 1.746 1.925 8.405 
Construction 596 554 1.309 1.048 1.249 4.756 
Industry 611 401 546 422 291 2.271 
Agriculture 118 33 48 45 35 279 
Service 149 149 220 231 350 1.099 
Foreign 101 249 380 300 171 1.201 
Construction 53 94 111 93 65 416 
Industry 24 34 68 47 22 195 
Agriculture 0 3 6 3 5 17 
Service 24 118 195 157 79 573 
Source:  AISA 
  
 
3.2.3 Macroeconomic Policies (fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate management)  
 Another important economic recovery has been macroeconomic stability—a 
remarkable achievement by the government after more than a decade of high inflation. 
Considerable success has been achieved in mobilizing domestic revenues, which from 
negligible levels in 2001 reached more than 4 percent of official GDP in 2003.88 The 
                                                           
88 Ministry of Public Health, General Directorate of Health Care and Promotion, National EPI Office, 
Expanded Program on Immunization , Financial Sustainability Plan, 2004 - 2009  
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government is following a prudent debt policy, under which most external assistance is 
sought in the form of grants and credits are taken only at highly concessional rates.89   
  
3.2.4 Finance and Private Sector Development: 
 The Afghan government has also made progress in reviving the financial system 
and supporting private sector development. New financial sector legislation (the Central 
Bank Law and Banking Law) was adopted in the summer of 2003 to grant the Central 
Bank independence and establish a modern legal framework for the banking system. 90 
Significant foreign private investment has been attracted into the telecommunication 
sector, with very good results in terms of expansion of private mobile telephone services 
across a number of cities on a competitive, cost efficient basis.91 
 
3.3 Trade Reform: 
  Since 2001, IMF reported that trade has been a very active sector in Afghanistan. 
Total trade in 2007 (exports plus imports) was estimated over $8.5 billion (excluding 
opium), comprised of $6.7 billion in imports and $1.8 billion in exports, of which $1.2 
billion were re-exports and $150 million were smuggling (IMF, 2008a). In five years, 
licit trade (official exports) has grown over 300 percent, with volume increasing four-
fold. Official imports are equally impressive, growing by a factor of three during the 
same period; mostly due to reconstruction efforts (see Table 3). All these improvement 
have to do with the fact that the government has implemented a number of reforms to 
                                                           
89 In 2004 the Government has verified close to US$200 million of debt incurred by previous 
administrations. The main uncertainty relates to claims from Russia. Since 2001, the Government has taken 
credits in the order of US$600 million (13 percent of GDP), all on concessional terms typically involving 
zero interest and a long grace period.  
90 WHO, State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Poverty, A Country Economic Report September 9, 2004  
91 Ibid. p. 6 
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foster trade. Custom tariffs have been rationalized (elimination of export duties, use of 
market exchange rate for imports valuation; streamlined tariff structure—moving from 25 
tariff rates of 0-150 percent to six rates between 2.5 percent and 16 percent; new, more 
effective broker processes).92 Existing trade agreements have been renewed and new 
agreements signed with neighboring countries. At the Cancun trade meeting, government 
representatives pledged to build a foreign trade regime that will allow Afghanistan to 
easily pass the standards for World Trade Organization accession over the next few 
years.93 Quantitative restrictions are extremely few and not imposed for reasons of 
protection. Customs administration reforms are underway.  
Table 3. Afghanistan: Balance of Payment, 2002/03-2006/07 (In millions of U.S. 
dollars) 
 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07* 
Current account (including 
grants) -149.8 -456.2 -265 -182.5 -444 
Current account (excluding 
grants) -1371.6 -2932.1 -3894 -4880.3 -5435.5 
Trade balance -1217.6 -2485.7 -3443.3 -4335.3 -4941.6 
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)** 1290.6 1893.6 1643 1794.8 1801.3 
Official exports 100.1 143.7 305.3 385.9 416.5 
Unofficial exports 1190.5 1749.9 1337.7 1408.9 1384.8 
Smuggling 176.6 232.8 152.7 173.7 149.9 
Transit trade 1013.9 1517.1 1185.1 1235.2 1234.9 
Imports of goods (f.o.b.) -2508.2 -4379.3 -5086.3 -6130.1 -6742.9 
Official imports -1983.1 -3282.9 -4415.8 -5481.7 -6049.2 
Of which: Duty free -840.8 -1594.4 -2416.2 -3258.3 -3579.4 
Smuggling -525.1 -1096.4 -670.5 -648.4 -693.7 
Source: IMF (2008a) 
*Preliminary estimate 
** Excludes opium exports and, due to limited data availability, flows associated with 




                                                           




3.4 The Reconstruction process:  
 Since Afghanistan is perceived to be of importance in military and political 
security among Western industrial countries at the beginning of the 2001, donors drafted 
a detailed and comprehensive needs assessment for the reconstruction and development 
of Afghanistan with which to solicit external financial aid and launch international 
assistance programs in 2002. Some $1.1 billion of external assistance was disbursed in 
late 2001 and 2002, mainly for humanitarian purposes and not through government 
channels.94 The government presented its National Development Framework (NDF) in 
April 2002, which formed the basis of the National Development Budget. Subsequently 
the Security Afghanistan’s Future (SAF) reported detailed medium-term investment and 
recurrent expenditure requirements and external financing needs and was presented at a 
major donor conference in Berlin in March 2004.95 The composition of external 
assistance, which increased to $2.5 billion in the 2003/04 financial year, has shifted in 
favor of reconstruction, with increasing government leadership.96 
 
3.5 Stimulated economy by foreign aid 
Agriculture: 
 In the agricultural sector performance 
has not been so successful, but mostly due to 
exogenous factors like the recent drought 
that affected cereal production and also the 
                                                           





interaction between legal agriculture and opium production. Agriculture’s share of GDP 
has been diminishing since the mid-90s, but even after a period of drought causing 
negative for 20 percent growth in the sector in 2006/2007 (IMF, 2008a), agriculture still 
accounts for 32% of estimated total GDP (2003), mainly cereal crops (27%) and by the 
opium economy (an estimated 35% of GDP) and it accounted for almost one-half of 
Afghanistan’s exports in 2006 (IMF, 2008c). It is also the main occupation and means of 
subsistence of the vast majority of the population, although livelihood reliance on 
agriculture as a single source has dropped as households in some areas have responded to 
drought by diversifying their livelihood strategies (Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network ,FEWSNET, 2007).  
 Other sectors are relatively small, including manufacturing (9%)—most of its small-
scale agricultural processing and other small-scale activities, construction (3%), and 
public administration (3%). The striking feature of Afghanistan’s economic structure is 
the dominance of the informal sector—not only in agriculture and in the drug industry 
(outright illegal), but also in the most other sectors. Small-scale generators in the 
informal sector, for example, provide a large portion of electricity supply. It is inherently 
difficult to estimate the size of the informal economy, except in sectors where it is 
dominant like agriculture and narcotics. Nevertheless, it is clear that some 80-90% of 
economic activity in Afghanistan occurs in the informal sector, which has been largely 
responsible for the economic recovery and dynamism.97 
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Cultivation of poppies remains the largest and most important industry in Afghanistan 
(UNODC, 2007). Over 4 percent of the agricultural land (193.000 ha) is devoted to 
opium farming and some 3.3 million Afghans are involved in opium cultivation. Opium 
income to farmers was $760 million in 2007, while potential exports of opium were $3.1 
billion during the same year (Byrd, 2007). However, farmers are receiving a lower 
percentage of the potential value of the crop, from 48% in 2002 to only 24.5% in 2006. 
This could imply that more processing is being conducted in Afghanistan, or that lower 
prices are being paid to farmers. In addition, the share of potential exports of opium to 
total GDP declined from 62.4% in 2002 to 44.0% in 2006.98 Opium production has been 
increasing rapidly in Afghanistan, from 3,400 metric tons in 2002 to 8,200 metric tons in 
2007 (UNODC, 2008). The Afghan opium crop now constitutes 93% of the word’s total 
opium output.  Despite this growth in output, the number of provinces growing opium has 
decreased from a high of 34 in 2004 to 21 provinces in 2007, most of which are located 
in the south of the country (see Table 7). Cannabis production is increasing, with some 
70.000 hectares cultivated in 2007 (UNODC, 2007). Farm-gate value of opium accounts 
for 13 percent of official GDP, whilst the whole opium/heroin sector amounts to 35 
percent. Once opium is taken out of the official agriculture figures, legal agriculture is 
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3.5.3 Industry  
 Afghanistan’s Industry is driven by construction, but also manufacturing, has 
been one of the most dynamic sectors during the last five years, accounting for over one-
quarter of 2006 GDP. Construction is one of the main driving forces behind the growth of 
the sector, and was the most dynamic sub-sector in 2006/2007, with 30 percent growth 
(IMF, 2008b). This reveals the important resources devoted to infrastructure 
reconstruction, but also how the large amounts of drug money are reinvested in real estate 
in Afghanistan (the rest is invested outside the country). Textiles, clothes and leather 
represented the second largest sub-sector, but it was the largest sector in terms of exports 
(including carpets and skins). It is worth noting that even in the presence of strong 
foreign inflows the manufacturing sector has been able to keep up with the rest of the 
economy in terms of growth, supporting the idea that exchange rate management has 
been adequate or in general the benefits associated from investment and stability that go 
directly to reinforce country’s competitiveness. However, growth in all these sectors is 
influenced by the very low levels from which the sectors started, following a process of 
deindustrialization through conflict that, in the last year for which data is available, 1995, 
had left Afghan industry with only 10 percent of GDP.100  
 
3.5. 4 The Informal Economy 
 It has been reported that 80-90 percent of country’s GDP is informal, including 35 
percent of illegal opium related activities and an array of other informal activities (World 
Bank, 2005c). No accurate estimation exists, but more than one-half of this black 
economy (non-opium) is subsistence level agriculture and livestock (World Bank, 




2005c). The black economy includes also barter trade, manufacturing and commerce and 
other non-recorded services (e.g., the hawala system or electricity from small-scale 
generators), but also smuggling and re-exports. The smuggled exports include gravels 
and construction materials, gems and semi-precious stones, logging and other non-
recorded exports, but this has decrease from 5 percent of official GDP in 2002/03 to 2 
percent in 2006/07. Smuggled imports were estimated at US$690m in 2006/07, but the 
contribution from that to the GDP should only include the value added that is generated 
in the country and consider the loss in tariff revenues. We roughly estimate this to be 
around 2.5 percent of legal GDP in 2007.101  A large re-export activity exists between 
Afghanistan and neighboring countries (mostly Pakistan), but the value added from this 
activity and hence its contribution to the Afghan GDP is also very low, probably between 
2-3.5 percent of official GDP in 2007.102 Based on these rough approximations, the whole 
smuggling (imports and exports) and re-export sector would represent no more than 8 
percent of official GDP in 2007. 
 
 The main components in the informal economy are: non-recorded agriculture and 
livestock (~30 percent of official GDP, World Bank 2005c), opium production and 
processing activities (35 percent of official GDP, World Bank 2005c), illegal trade (6.5-8 
percent of official GDP, as per our estimations) and other non-recorded activities 
(including small manufacturing and services).  
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 The official figure from the government for unemployment is 40 percent (ANDS). 
But little more is known about the size and composition of the labour market in the 
country. Using NRVA 2005, we estimated the importance of different sectors in the 
occupational profile of the economy (see Annex 2 for the list of occupation and a 
description of our aggregated definitions). Table 8 present the results. At the national 
level, 66 percent of the households depend on agriculture (including opium103) and 
livestock as the main source of income, this number is 66% in rural areas and 14% in the 
cities. Trade and services employ 15 percent of the national population but is –as 
expected—the main source in urban areas (64 percent as first source, 14 percent as 
second source). Manufacturing is just 1 percent at national levels, with 3 percent in urban 
areas, being the third largest occupation.  
 
 Any discussion of economic growth policy systems must recognize what Pain and 
Goodhand have described as the three economic systems that operate in Afghanistan 
simultaneously: 104 
1) The warlord economy, 
2) The black-market economy, 
3) The coping or subsistence economy. 
 
The warlord economy is run by what Pain and Goodhand call “conflict entrepreneurs,” 
that is, by regional and local armed commanders and fighters who engage in hostilities 
                                                           
103 NRVA is based on self-reporting and therefore all figures relative to opium are considered to be 
underestimated. 
104 A. Pain and J. Goodhand, “Afghanistan: Current Employment and Socio-economic  
Situation and Prospects,” International Labour Organisation, Infocus program on crisis  
response and reconstruction, Working Paper no. 8 (March 2002), p, 2. 
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not only to protect ethnic and religious values but also, and perhaps primarily, to make 
profits and accumulate wealth and power.  Their economy is based on smuggling 
consumer goods, minerals, wheat, and opium, informal taxation of both legal and illicit 
economic activities, arms trading, economic blockades, asset stripping and looting, and 
illegal currency trading. 105 The warlord economy is primarily exploitive rather than 
productive. It has disrupted markets, destroyed economic assets, violently redistributed 
resources, created illegal entitlements, and further impoverished vulnerable groups. In 
some regions, warlords have driven out the better-educated population especially those 
associated with minority ethnic or religious groups.  The black market economy operated 
in some places by warlords consists more widely of noncombatant profiteers, traders in 
illegal goods, cross-borders smugglers, poppy farmers and opium dealers, and truck 
drivers who constitute the “transport mafia”. Black-market economy participant’s benefit 
from continuing military conflict, ethnic and religious tensions, and a weak state. The 
black-market economy thrives in the absence of other legal means of making profits and 
creating wealth and is primarily diversionary rather than developmental. Participants 
derive income from unsustainable extraction of natural resources and minerals; 
smuggling of antiquities, rare animals, and minerals; the flourishing hawala money-order 
and currency-exchange systems; and the capture and diversion of international aid 
resources.106 
 The coping economy in which most of the Afghan population participates in is 
characteristic of a subsistence agricultural sector and a weak system of commercial trade. 
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In the coping economy, poor families and communities often exploit the labor of children 
in order to survive during periods of widespread asset erosion. Those engaged in the 
coping economy obtain their livelihoods from diverse low-risk activities such as 
subsistence agriculture, petty trade, and on- and off-farm low wage labor. Some 
participants migrate to Pakistan, Iran, or other countries surrounding Afghanistan and 
remit part of their earnings to dependents back home. Others survive on income 
redistribution and support through extended family, local ethnic and religious networks, 
and humanitarian assistance. The coping economy both results from, and reinforces, the 
lack of secure and steady employment and long-term investment and the deterioration in 
health and education standards.  
 
3.6 Improvements needed in the private sector:  
 A dynamic private sector is essential for Afghanistan to achieve the robust, 
sustained economic growth that is necessary for national poverty reduction, state 
building, and other reconstruction objectives. Tremendous entrepreneurial talents exist in 
Afghanistan, but in order to be the “engine of growth” the private sector must be able and 
encouraged to move beyond the bounds of the informal economy. While Afghanistan will 
continue to have a great many small, household and family-based businesses in 
agriculture, handicrafts, trade, and other services, some enterprises need to grow into 
medium or even large firms, thereby becoming a source of competitiveness for 
Afghanistan. According to (…) the challenge for the Government in encouraging and 
supporting private sector development is: 
 (i) To support through macroeconomic policies a strong demand environment for the 
private sector, by maintaining robust economic growth; 
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(ii) To create a structural and regulatory enabling environment in which private 
enterprises can compete and grow;  
(iii) To ensure that key infrastructure services (power, roads, water, telecommunication) 
are efficiently provided to the private sector; (iv) To help the private sector build capacity 
(including through financial services and business support services) so that it will be able 
to respond effectively to opportunities. 107 
 
 In order for the Afghan economy to run at its fullest potential, it needs to 
overcome these challenges: Creative alternative, stable livelihoods and entrepreneurial 
opportunities in agriculture, trading services, mining, natural resources development, and 
small-scale manufacturing, and the acceleration of macroeconomic growth, may be the 
only ways to lure participants from the warlord and black-market economies into 
mainstream economic activities and provide those caught in the coping economy with 
more fruitful opportunities. Creating those opportunities depends not only on achieving 
reconstruction objectives quickly, but also on laying the foundations for long-term 
economic growth. 
 
3.6.1 Alternative growth strategies 
 There is a debate among international development organizations about how best 
to initiate economic growth in subsistence economies, and international assistance 
organizations have experimented with a wide range of interventions to help poor 
countries.108 Two general strategies emerged—a “big push” or “balanced development” 
strategy that seeks to promote rapidly a comprehensive set of changes simultaneously in 
order to create the conditions that launch and sustain economic growth, and a “leading 
sector” strategy that seeks sequential changes in one or two sectors and relies on the 
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creation of lateral linkages and multiplier effects for spreading growth to other sectors of 
the economy over time.109 
 a) The big push strategy relies on observations, primarily in advanced economies, 
that all sectors are interdependent and that massive investment is needed in both the 
private sector and the public sector simultaneously, in order to trigger economic 
growth.110 The interdependence of all sectors implies that investment in only one sector 
would not stimulate growth throughout the whole economy. The strategy requires 
investment, mainly in industry, but also concurrently in agriculture, services, 
infrastructure, education, technology, and health in order to stimulate macroeconomic 
growth and to provide mutually reinforcing support in all sectors for continued 
development. The experience with international development over the past 50 years, 
however indicates that in most countries, a big push approach is often difficult to launch 
and the impacts are not always positive. As the United Nation Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) pointed out in its 50-year assessment of development experience, 
“such a strategy, based on industry-led growth and often accomplished through an urban 
bias in fiscal and social policies largely failed, leaving behind vast rural poverty and food 
insecurity while accelerating problems linked to rapid urbanization.”111  
  
 b) The other approach, a leading sector strategy, also sees the interdependence of 
sectors in the economy but asserts that focused investment in one or two key sectors can 
drive growth in all others to which they are linked. More importantly, leading sector 
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theorists recognize the limited absorptive capacities, governance and administrative 
capacities, entrepreneurial and business skills, and access to capital resources in poor 
countries that are needed to make a big push or balanced development strategy work.112 
Advocates of leading sector strategy argue that resources should be concentrated in one 
or two sectors of the economy that will generate multiplier effects by creating demand in 
other sectors, leading to a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. Often the 
leading sector chosen for investment is agriculture because the majority of the population 
in poor countries earns its livelihood from farming, petty trading, and services in rural 
areas. 113 By focusing on agriculture and rural development, economic growth can be 
stimulated from the bottom-up rather than top-down, benefiting those in farming and 
rural enterprise more quickly and assuring a more equitable distribution of wealth.  
Afghanistan’s National Development Framework does not outline a specific strategy for 
initiating growth. It does identify a broad set of economic and social reconstruction 
projects that might imply a big push approach, but it also recognizes that not all of them 
are likely to be undertaken together at the same time. Implying a more sequential 
approach, the framework identifies priorities for immediate reconstruction as well as for a 
long-term development. The plans of international assistance organization seem to 
recognize even more clearly that the existing conditions of Afghanistan and the 
experience with economic development in other poor and war-torn countries suggest that 
growth must be initiated in the agricultural and rural sectors. By any measure—average 
per capita income, life expectancy, other social indicators, or broader indexes like the 
U.N Human Development Index (HDI)—Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in 
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the world. Afghanistan was very poor before the war and fell further behind the rest of 
the world during the past quarter-century. Recent rapid economic growth and 
improvements in some social indicators have not yet changed this situation. Since 2003, 
2.5 million Afghan refugees have returned to their home country, while an additional 
600,000 IDPs have moved back to their place of origin. About 40% of refugees have 
returned to Kabul and many others to urban centers across the country.114  
 
3.6.2 Poverty reduction: Main element of growth 
 The Afghan Government has set ambitious targets for growth and human 
development, reflecting the country’s need to make up for a quarter of a century of 
conflict. Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF; Afghanistan Government 2004) outlines a 
scenario with average annual growth of 9 percent for non-drug GDP during the medium 
term, with income per capita rising to $500 in 2015.115This scenario is underpinned by an 
investment program of $25.6 billion over seven years (with external assistance 
requirements, including for recurrent expenditures, of $27.6 billion).116 The SAF report is 
equally ambitious in targeting large improvements in social indicators, in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals. The gross primary school enrollment rate is targeted to 
rise from 54 percent (40 for girls) at present to 100 percent for boys and girls by 2015. 
The under-five mortality rate is targeted to decline from 172 to 130 per 1,000 live births, 
the infant mortality rate from 115 to 55 per 1,000 live births, and the maternal mortality 
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rate from an estimated 1,600 per 100,000 live births to 205.117 Indeed, robust, sustained 
economic growth is essential for Afghanistan to secure peace and improve human 
development. First, it is a necessary condition to get out of deep poverty—and therefore 
the central element of a poverty reduction strategy.118  Second, growth is crucial for state 
building and political stabilization.119  Economic growth impacts positively on security, 
by creating revenues for the government to build police and army forces and by providing 
people with more of a stake in society. Economic growth will also generate viable 
alternatives to opium production. Finally, economic growth creates revenue potential, 
which if tapped in a transparent and non-distortionary way through effective taxation, 
will generate the domestic fiscal resources that will enable Afghanistan over time to 
become financially self-sufficient and to provide effective services to its people—another 
key factor in poverty reduction.120 Thus the key development challenge for Afghanistan 
is to put in place the institutions, policies, and services that will generate sustained, 
broad-based economic growth.121 As noted in the SAF report, in addition to the level, the 
quality of economic growth will be critical (the quality of growth is very important). 
What is needed is growth with improving social indicators (reflecting investments in 
human capital) and without a significant deterioration in income distribution.122 This 
ensures continuing broad consensus around the policies and decisions needed to create 
the enabling environment for economic growth. In the Afghan context, growth needs to 
be labor-intensive, sustainable macro-economically and financially, and environment-
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friendly and conducive to social development.123 Growth also needs to be reasonably 
well-balanced ethnically and regionally in order to avoid exacerbating political tensions 
among different groups and regions. 124 
 
3.6.3 Main Elements of Growth Strategy  
 In essence, the Afghan Government’s strategy for rapid, sustained, broad-
based economic growth centers on the development of a dynamic private sector and is 
anchored in four key elements:125 
(i) Improving security through fair and effective enforcement of law and order 
 and building an effective, accountable State,  
(ii) Maintaining macroeconomic stability,  
(iii) Delivering support services (especially infrastructure), and  
(iv) Creating an enabling environment for business activity through regulatory 
and structural reforms.  
 
The government has already made a very good start by maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and initiating some important structural reforms, as well as capacity building in 
the administration. These very successful and important initiatives need to be 
complemented by capacity building and delivery of key infrastructural services, by easing 
the regulatory burden on the private sector and reducing vulnerability to corruption, and 




                                                           







3.6.4 Rule of Law  
 The first and most fundamental requirement to break out of the “informal 
equilibrium” is to build security, an appropriate legal framework and functioning judicial 
system, effective law enforcement mechanisms, and a capable and effective state.127 In 
the general term, the stability, security, and prosperity of Afghanistan will depend on the 
ability of the state to raise the resources needed to fund the provision of necessary public 
services. In the SAF report, the government stated its intention to cover its wage bill in 
five to six years time, and its entire recurrent budget in nine to eleven years time.128 Over 
the last two years, it has already achieved a significant increase in revenues. Additional 
progress in mobilizing resources will depend on:129 
(i) The security situation and administrative capacity of the government, and  
(ii) The structure of the economy.  
 
Security sector reform is critical, and this component will also need to include 
reintegration of disarmed combatants. Government capacity building is underway and 
needs to be accelerated, on a sustainable basis. Progress in strengthening and reform of 
the judiciary, which has lagged, will be crucial. Building on informal institutions to 
create formal institutions is a promising option for moving toward a functioning legal 
system. Adequate property rights, for instance land titles, enhance the value of assets 
because, with appropriate institutions for property disputes, they can be used as collateral 
for credit and facilitate a longer time horizon on the part of their owners. 130 
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3.6.5 Economic Growth and Development Policy  
 The reconstruction and development of Afghanistan, following decades of 
internal conflict and external military intervention, pose challenging dilemmas for 
international assistance organizations and donor countries that have pledged billions of 
dollars in aid. Economic growth is essential to generate jobs, income, public revenues, 
and the capital needed to reconstruct the country’s destroyed infrastructure. It is needed 
to provide some sense of security and to stabilize Afghanistan, politically and socially.  
Establishing some degree of social and political stability and military security and at least 
minimally effective system governance, are generally recognized as preconditions for 
stimulating economic growth. 131In Afghanistan much of the basic agricultural and 
manufacturing infrastructure has been destroyed; economic and political institutions have 
been weakened; and the domestic and international markets for Afghanistan’s food 
supplies, livestock, and manufactured goods have been disrupted or lost. Ethnic and 
regional tensions plague a fragmented society, and human capital has deteriorated from 
years of interrupted education and training, and from the steady decline in health and 
social services. Governance systems in Afghanistan are still weak and state’s authority 
barely extends beyond the capital. This is why Afghanistan is so dependent on the aid of 
donor government, international aid agencies, international organizations and NGOs to 
help it reach the developmental change beyond the capital in order to create a united 
growth across the country. These organizations are not to overlook opportunities, repeat 
mistakes, and ignore threats and complexities, and waste resources. 
 
 
                                                           




4.1 Public Health Overview: 
 The most progress has been made in Afghanistan’s health sector; it has come a 
long way since its invasion. A number of development partners, especially the World 
Bank, the European Union, and the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), 
have been key supporters of Afghanistan’s effort to rebuild and strengthen its health 
sector. Together the three donors invested more than $820 million between 2003/04 and 
2008/09 and played key roles in helping the government reshape the health sector.132  The 
key challenges the country is facing include high infant and under-five mortality rates, a 
very high maternal mortality ratio, with most deaths preventable if more births were 
attended by skilled providers and properly referred; poor sanitation and malnutrition, and 
a high burden of disease from malaria and tuberculosis.133 
 
4.1.1 Why is the health sector much more important than other sectors? 
 It has to do with the fact that Afghanistan has a high agricultural capacity and 
good water sources, and agricultural and economic experts believe that Afghanistan has a 
capacity high enough to exceed the limit of self-sufficiency in food and agricultural 
production. Afghanistan has 7.9 million hectares of arable land, of which only 3 million 
hectares are cultivated and about 5 million remain uncultivated.134 Afghanistan uses 
merely 30% of its existing water sources. Reconstruction of irrigation system and 
investment on water sources can increase food production so that the remaining 5 million 
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hectares of arable land can be used and on the other hand, harvest from irrigated land is at 
least twice that from rain-fed or non-irrigated land.135 The Ministry of Agriculture, 
Irrigation, and Animal Husbandry estimates that about 85% of Afghan people are 
farmers, though one needs to be skeptical about this figure given the population increase 
in urban areas. Sufficient investment is yet to be made in Afghan agriculture and water 
sources. Until the Paris Conference, the Afghan government and international community 
did not pay the necessary attention to agricultural development and this was a mistake per 
se. Agricultural approaches in Afghanistan remain localized and outdated and have yet to 
be mechanized; there are no reserves or refrigerating rooms to sustain food items and 
fruit. Farmers are forced to urgently offer their products to markets and even sometimes 
Afghan fruit is sent to Pakistan, kept in Pakistani reserves for a while, and then exported 
to Afghanistan to be sold at a higher rate.136  The year 2008/2009 was a difficult year for 
agriculture. Drought dominated throughout Afghanistan and many domestic animals 
died. The Afghan government needed over 2.30 million metric tons of wheat to meet the 
needs of the people and at the same time, food prices increased. Although government 
and World Food Program (WFP) assistance were able to help the needy to some extent 
by lowering and controlling food prices, prices still remained high.  
 
4.1.2 The fundamental right to health 
 The right to the highest attainable standard of health means that all individuals 
should have an ever-increasing access to health services and facilities without distinction 
of any kind. This involves four dimensions, namely, physical accessibility, economic 
                                                           




accessibility, informational accessibility, and non-discrimination. Health services, 
materials, and facilities should be physically and safely available for all, especially 
vulnerable categories of people and all persons should be able to afford such services, 
materials, and facilities. On one hand, people have the right to search for information on 
health-related issues and on the other, health services and facilities should be provided for 
all people without discrimination of any form. Another significant issue is the 
acceptability of health services and facilities, meaning that these should be compatible 
with people’s mentality and culture and planned so that that they will be accepted by the 
general public. 
 
 According to Article 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) it recognizes that all people have the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health. Pursuant to international human rights instruments, health 
services should be provided cheaply and non-discriminatorily for all.137  Article 52 of the  
Afghan Constitution requires the government to provide the means for the prevention and 
cure of ailments and to render free health facilities for all citizens.138   
 
4.1.3 Access to Health Services & Insecurity 
 Although health services are almost free of charge for all Afghan people, 
vulnerable segments of population encounter many problems since health services have 
poor quality or inadequate geographical coverage. That is why men’s life expectancy is 
only 47 years and it is 45 for women—almost half of life expectancy in world’s 
developed and wealthier countries. The Afghan government and its international partners 
                                                           




always allude to the development of the health sector as one of their significant 
achievements in the past several years. The government claims approximately 85% of all 
Afghan people presently have access to health services. Although The Human Rights 
Field Monitoring (HRFM) Team (HRFM) findings reveal that such a claim is close to 
reality, health services nevertheless face several major challenges in Afghanistan.139  
Poor-quality health services and facilities, long distances of health centers from remote 
districts, and growing insecurity are among these challenges. On the other hand, 
experienced and specialized doctors are unwilling to work in outlying areas for economic 
and geographical reasons.  
 
 According to Interviews HRFM has conducted in 2008, 92.4% of all interviewees 
said that state or NGO health services were available to them, around 7.4% said these 
services were unavailable to them, and 0.1% did not answer this question. At the same 
time, 56% of all interviewees stated that private health services were available to their 
families; around 30.2% said such services were unavailable for their families, and about 
13.0% did not answer this question. The added percentage of people who responded that 
state or NGO health services were unavailable to them (7.4%) and the percentage of 
people who stated that private health services were unavailable to them (30.2%), we will 
have a percentage of 37.6%. Therefore, in aggregate terms, about 62.4% of interviewees 
have access to state or NGO or private health services, and around 37.6% of interviewees 
have no access to state or NGO or private health services. This figure stands in gross 
contrast to the claim made by the Government that 85% of all Afghans are covered by 
health services.  
                                                           




 State or NGO health services are greater than private ones. According HRFM 
survey on the matter, 45.7% of interviewees stated they have access to state health 
services, 40.9% stated they have access to private health services, and 13.4% stated they 
have access to non-state health services140.  
 
 
According to HRFM interviews, the number of hospitals is less than that of health centers 
and mobile clinics, indicating that health centers and mobile clinics offer around 75% of 
health services and the remaining services (25%) are rendered by hospitals.  
  
 As mentioned earlier, approximately 93% of people have access to state and non-
state health services, but there are problems in the quality of their access to these 
services.  
These problems, according to HRFM, include long distances of centers, poor-quality 
medicine, poor facilities, and inexperienced personnel. Around 29.2% of interviewees 
said that they do not use state or NGO health services. Data shows that 61% of 
interviewees use state or NGO health services and around 8.4% did not answer this 





question. Accessibility is the most important factor for not using health facilities. The 
following figure presents these reasons.  
 
 
Data shows that physical inaccessibility is the most significant reason why people are not 
able to access health services, both public and private. Long distances of health facilities 
make it very different for people in outlying districts to access them. Some interviewees 
stated that they are forced to pay a lot for transportation in order to reach health centers 
like hospitals and some use horses and donkeys to take their patients to health centers, 
spending several hours on the way to reach these centers.141  Health services offered by 
private institutions also have shortcomings and problems. HRFM data shows that around  
8.6% of interviewees do not use private health services, around 47.1% use such services, 
and around 44.3% did not reply. Interviewees who do not use private health services 
provided the same responses as those who do not use state or NGO health services.  
Reasons why interviewees do not use private health services include inaccessibility, poor- 





quality medicine and equipment, and inexperienced personnel. Approximately 25.1% of 
interviewees do not use such services because of inaccessibility, 3.8% do not use because 
they have to pay money, 4.6% do not use because of poor-quality medicine and 
equipment, 5.8% do not use because health personnel are inexperienced, and 1.7% do not 
use because there are no female staff. Poor-quality medicine is a key shortcoming of 
health services in Afghanistan. This problem is more serious in rural areas and outlying 
districts, because the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) exerts less control there. Its been 
reported that the Ministry burnt around 3,525 items of outdated and non-standardized 
medicine amounting, in general, to 86 tones.142 This shows the Ministry’s monitoring of 
health services in the country and at the same time, it is indicative of a huge amount of 
outdated and non-standardized medicine in the health market.143  
  
 
 The foregoing shows that people have a problem of physical access to health 
centers, either private or state or NGO sponsored and hence, there should be an increase 
                                                           





in the number of health centers in different areas, especially in disadvantaged ones. 
Another difficulty is the poor-quality medicine and equipment, and inexperienced and 
low-capacity health personnel, to which many interviewees referred. More efforts should 
be taken to raise the quality of health services.144 
  
 A key component of the right to health is the acceptability of health services. Such 
services should be provided that people do not feel alienated and to be “the other”. The 
presence of female midwives, nurses, and doctors is a must in hospitals and other health 
centers. In many areas, patients do not consult hospitals and clinics unless they are in a 
critical condition. This issue is more often seen among women, especially in areas where 
there are no women nurses and doctors. The government should train more women as 
birth attendants, midwives, nurses, and physicians. As part of government’s reporting to 
the electorate, MoPH said that hundreds of female health personnel were trained in 
(2008/09).145 The Ministry’s 2009 report says that 19,975 community health personnel 
were trained in 34 provinces in the previous year with 50.8% of them being men and 
49.2% being women.146  
 
 Among other concerns is the growing insecurity which has limited the delivery of 
health services. According to the Third Report on Economic and Social Rights of ( ) 
covering the period from March 2007 to early 2008, health workers have been targeted 
by government opposition in southern and southeastern areas, as a result of which the 
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government closed down around 36 health centers only in the first three months of 2008, 
depriving about 360,000 people of health services134. It is difficult to study whether this 
state of affairs has continued, because there is a lack of accurate information as a result of 
rising insecurity in (2008/09); but it can undoubtedly be said that security if the situation 
has not improved more health centers may have to be shut down.147  The Afghan 
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) is encouraged by the objectives of 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) to extend the basic package of 
health services to at least 90% of the population by 2010.148 However, in line with the 
findings of this commission report which indicate that the main obstacle is not the 
availability of health care facilities but an inability to access existing health facilities, the 
Commission urges the Government and international development partners to focus their 
efforts on tackling obstacles preventing access to health facilities, rather than simply 
increasing the number of clinics.149  
 
 Initials benchmarks in the ANDS Monitoring Matrix indicate that there will be an 
emphasis on increasing community access to health care, including outreaches work by 
trained health workers. In particular this would address some of the obstacles preventing 
rural women from using existing health facilities, and enable access for vulnerable group 
such as the elderly, disabled, children, minorities, migrant laborers and remote rural 
communities.  
 







4.2 Women and Children’s health 
Afghanistan has some of the highest infant and under-five mortality rates in the world, 
although both rates have steadily declined since 1960. In 2002 the number of deaths per 
1,000 live births was estimated at 165 for infants and 257 for children under five 
(UNICEF 2004).  Considerable investments in the health sector since 2003 has 
contributed to reductions in both mortality rates: the under-five mortality rate dropped 26 
percent and the infant mortality rate dropped 22 percent between 2003 and 2006.  At 
present the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target for Afghanistan is to reduce the 
infant mortality rate to 82 per 1,000 live births and the under-five mortality rate to 128 
deaths per 1,000 live births by 2015. If these targets are to be achieved, Afghanistan 
needs to register the progress at a higher rate than it did between 2003, 2006 and 2009.  
Infant mortality rate is in every 1,000 live births, under-five child mortality rate is  
191 in every 1,000 live births and maternal mortality rate are 1,800 in every 100,000 live 
births, placing Afghanistan with the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world 
just after Sierra Leone. Though efforts to raise parental awareness on child bearing and 
rearing have greatly contributed to the fall of under-five child mortality rate, the existing 
child mortality level is unacceptable.150 Under-five mortality rate in Afghanistan is 
caused by infectious factors and diarrhea, acute respiratory infections, and vaccine-
preventable diseases account for around 60% of mortality cases. HRFM data indicates 
that over 62% of women gave birth to their children without the support of professionally 
trained health personnel. Of 18 cases recorded by the AIHRC regarding violations of the 
right to health, 6 cases—roughly one-third—are related to women’s health. One should 
note that addressing women’s health without considering traditions and customs that 
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deprive them of access to health services will not yield an effective result. Traditional 
practices and harmful customs are the main reasons why women are deprived of 
accessing health services, while 40% of basic health facilities lack female staff 
members.151  
  
 Interviews with 6,675 children as part of HRFM indicate that 16.9% of these 
children do not use hospitals, clinics, and other health facilities when they fall ill. The 
most significant reasons were long distance (43.9%), lack of medicine (13.2%), lack of 
women personnel (3.7%), and expensive services (8.8%)130. This is while pursuant to 
the Afghanistan Compact, primary healthcare should cover 90% of Afghanistan’s 
population by 2010, all under-five children should be vaccinated, and child mortality rate 
should drop by 20%.  
  
 Reduction in child and maternal mortality rate is an indicator of improvement in the 
delivery of health services. The majority of interviewees said that there was no doctor or 
birth attendant available to assist the delivery of their last child. HRFM found out that  
50% of interviewees were assisted by their relatives and friends during the delivery of 
their last child.152 Around 15.4% of interviewees said doctors or nurses assisted the 
delivery of their last child, 14% said that traditional birth attendants or educated birth 
attendants assisted the delivery of their last child. Similarly, 9.1% of interviewees stated 
that there was no one to help them when their last child was being born. The following 
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 According to the annual report of MoPH, in the year 1387 (2008/09), there was an 
increase of around 5% in the number of trained birth attendants, who offered about 31% 
of birth-related services.131 This figure is comparatively different from HRFM findings, 
for HRFM data shows that only 14% of interviewees were assisted by trained birth 
attendants during the delivery of their last child.  
  
 MoPH has considered two standards—distance and population—for building 
hospitals and clinics, which are rational and logical. But practice shows that the standard 
of distance has, to some extent, not been considered for the construction of health centers, 
because HRFM data indicates that about 50% of those who do not use state- or NGO-run 
health centers gave physical accessibility as the reason. To some degree, the Ministry has 
been successful in the construction of health centers. Of 312 planned clinics, 291 have 




been built and in addition, 54 mobile clinics have been established in 1387 (2008/09).154  
Vaccination campaigns have also yielded successes, despite growing insecurity.  
Approximately four nationwide campaigns were launched to eradicate polio with each 
campaign targeting 7.5 million under-five children. Additionally, vitamin A capsule 
vaccination was launched targeting 6.8 million children aged between six months and 
five years. It is noteworthy that this program was relatively implemented in insecure 
areas like Kandahar and Helmand.155  
 
4.2.1 Maternal Health 
 The maternal mortality ratio is extremely high in Afghanistan: the most recent 
data show 1,800 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (WHO 2007). Given the 
expansion and the utilization of maternal and child health services it has increased 
significantly in Afghanistan, albeit not uniformly across the country. Utilization is 
positively correlated with wealth status. It is much more difficult for the poor to get to the 
health facility; distance is a significant obstacle to seeking care. There is evidence that 
health facilities tend to be located closer to better-off households and farther from poor 
households.156 Comparing travel time to the nearest health facility using household’s 
routine mode of transportation, 13.5 percent of the poorest households live within two 
hours of household in the wealthiest quintile. Furthermore, 54.3 percent of households in 
the poorest quintile live more than six hours from a health facility, compared with only 
3.8 percent of households in the wealthiest quintile.157 
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4.2.2 Immunization and distance: 
 A massive vaccination program led to a marked reduction in confirmed polio 
cases. A measles mortality reduction campaign was conducted and reached more than 90 
percent of children six months to 12 years of age, and iodized salt has been provided to 
300,000 malnourished women and children.158 Despite the impressive economic recovery 
and initiation of a development strategy based on sound principles (outlined in the 
Government’s National Development Framework), Afghanistan still ranks very poorly on 
all social indicators. Based on a 2003 NDF sample survey, infant mortality at 115 per 
thousand live births and under-five mortality at 172 per thousand live births are among 
the highest in the world. The situation is particularly grim in rural areas where one out of 
five children dies before reaching five years of age. The estimated rate of maternal 
mortality (1,600 per 100,000 live births) is among the highest in the world. Nine out of 
ten births are not taking place in health facilities, and the corresponding figure is even 
higher in rural areas. Family planning is largely non-existent. Morbidity rates are 
extremely high: 30 percent of children under five years of age were reported to have 
diarrhea during the two-week period that preceded the survey and 19% to have suffered 
from severe respiratory diseases over the same period. Malnutrition is also a critical 
issue. Seventy percent of children do not receive timely complementary feeding (which 
could damage their physical and learning capacity).  Children living further from a health 
facility have lower immunization rates than other children. For example, the 
immunization rates for BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guerin;  among children who live more 




than four hours from a health facility is only 60 percent of that of children who live less 
than two hours from a facility.159  
 
4.2.3 Reproductive health care and distance:  
 Care seeking for reproductive health is low in Afghanistan there is more than a 25 
percentage point drop in the utilization of skilled birth attendance for women who live 
more than six hours from a health facility compared with women who live within two 
hours of a facility. Less than 5 percent of women giving birth who live more than six 
hours from a health facility have a skilled birth attendant. The relationship between 
distance to a health care facility and maternal care is reflected in maternal mortality 
ratios, which are extremely high in remote and rural areas. Rural areas, especially remote 
ones, have a double problem: rural facilities are less likely to have skilled female health 




4.3 The right to Food: 
 The right to food means assurance that all people have dignified access to the food 
they need. States should increasingly employ their resources to reduce levels of hunger, 
food insecurity, and malnutrition. This right comprises four elements, which include 
availability, accessibility, adequacy, and sustainability. The concept of food availability 
means that food should be provided either directly from production or through 
distribution, processing, and market system. This right requires that food should be both 
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physically and economically accessible, meaning that citizens should be able to easily 
access the food they need. On the other hand, the available food should have quality so 
that it can meet food needs and that food should be safe and culturally acceptable to all, 
with due consideration to their personal status, age, living conditions, job, and gender. 
This food should be available not only for the current generation, but for the generations 
to come also. The right to food requires the government to help their citizens provide 
their food needs by creating a favorable economic, political, and social environment. 
Inadequate economic activity is not the only reason for hunger and malnutrition, but these 
issues in Afghanistan depend on the ability of farmers to produce adequate food and on 
the access of people to livelihood options. In some cases, farms have good agricultural 
produce; the major problems could be solved if people can have access to food. This right 
is also related to Millennium Development Goal 1, eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger.  
 
4.3.1 Lack of economic power causes malnutrition 
 Unfortunately, a dilemma the Afghanis face is the lack of economic power to 
purchase food items. Food items are available in most Afghan markets, but people do not 
have the necessary income to purchase their food in markets. This, of course, varies 
geographically. For example, in Central Highlands and Northeast, people not only lack 
economic power to purchase food items, but they also cannot physically access food 
items in these areas, because there is a limited quantity of food items there.  Food security 
is a good indicator for poverty in Afghanistan, because food-insecure families were 
unable to provide themselves with adequate and nutritious food. HRFM data shows that 
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the majority of interviewees regard the creation of job opportunities as their top priority, 
followed by drinking water and food. As previously noted, employment and job 
opportunities fully depend on income levels and income too can be an indicator of 
poverty. HRFM findings reveal that 36% of all interviewees and 63.6% of those who 
work make a daily income of less than 50 Afghanis (approximately equivalent to US$1),  
19.2% make a daily income of over 50 Afghanis, and 44.8% either did not work or they 
were unwilling to answer this question, for their income may be illegal or they may have 
no income at all. Some 37% of vulnerable people made an income of less than 50 
Afghanis per day and 22% made an income of over 50 Afghanis per day in the past year, 
which refers to a 1% decrease in the number of people who make less than 50 Afghanis 
per day, but in contrast there is a 3% decrease in the number of people who make a daily 
income of over 50 Afghanis.160 Most importantly, there is a 3.8% increase in the number 
of people who did not answer this question or were unemployed.161 These indicate that 
poverty is spreading in Afghanistan and people’s income levels have been on the decline.  
  
 It is difficult to determine other indicators of poverty given the lack of systematic 
data.162 Government official statistics say that 44% of Afghan families are food-insecure. 
As previously noted, about 35% of families cannot provide their daily caloric needs.163 
and 61% of families have poor-quality food, taking into account the diversity of the food 
they eat.164  FAO study on the situation of nutrition found out that over 6% of children 










under the age of five suffer from acute malnutrition (low ratio of weight to height) and 
45-60% of children in the same age group suffer from chronic malnutrition (low ratio of 
weight to height).165.However, FAO data shows that there has been improvement in the 
situation of children with chronic malnutrition compared with previous years and that the 
percentage has fallen from 60 to 50%.166  
 
4.3.2 Other indicators of poverty: 
 During Human rights Field Monitoring interviews, the two main indicators used 
were the type of household income and the level of indebtedness amongst the families 
interviewed. Additional factors relating to reintegration of refugees and ongoing 
displacement can contribute to an understanding of the situation of the right to an 
adequate standard of living and have therefore been included in this analysis.  
The main sources of income amongst interviewees were identified as farm labor (31.8%), 
with only 13.5% of interviewees reporting a stable source of income. These results are 
consistent with the finding of the 2005 Millennium Development Goal Report.167 
 






 It is insufficient to define poverty on the basis of a single quantitative indicator. A 
thorough understanding of the nature of poverty and who the poor in Afghanistan are, 
should precede the finalization of any development strategy. The findings of this FAO 
and HRFM must be considered for a more qualitative definition of poverty and should 
guide the development of indicators in order to accurately monitor the impact of the 
ANDS on the poor and marginalized.168   
 
4.4 The Right to water 
The right to water crucially essential for Afghanistan development 
 The Afghani people need to have access to adequate, high-quality, and acceptable 
water to lead a life of health and dignity. Water sources should be adequately and 
continuously available for a person for such purposes as drinking, personal hygiene, 
washing, cooking, and family hygiene. Quality of water is also important and water 
should be free of any types of pollution and other dangers that threaten the health of 
people. In addition, water should be adequate and compatible with World Health 
Organisation (WHO) guidelines. Above all, water services and facilities should be made 
accessible for all, including the poorest and most isolated groups of people.169 The 
Afghan government has pledged under ANDS to reduce by half the ratio of people with 
no access to healthy potable water by 2020; 50% of families in Kabul and 30% of 
families in other urban areas shall have access to tap water by 2012; 90% of people in 
villages shall have access to drinking water; and 50% of people shall have access to 
sanitation in villages.  
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 Water supply projects are ongoing in the 34 provincial capital cities. The 
Directorate of Water Supply of Afghanistan, responsible for urban water supply, has been 
able to provide healthy water.170 Even though their report exhibits that a majority of 
interviewees do not have access to safe drinking water. In the National Development 
Strategy, the government should make reference to international guidelines on quality 
and accessibility of water171 in order to define indicator and monitor progress, and it 
should prioritize access to safe drinking water in both rural and urban areas.  The 
Commission urges the Government to take all necessary steps for consultation with 
relevant institutions in the drafting of the new legislation on water, with a view to 
ensuring that the law incorporates a rights-based approach to water regulation.  
Afghanistan Directorate Water supply have noted that an average 30% of urban wellers 
produced 15,000 cubic meters of healthy water per day in Kabul and around 30,000 at the 
national level, but it has now raised this to the level of 120,000 cubic meters of healthy 
water.172 Previously 65 to 70% of produced healthy water was wasted due to a limited 
water supply grid. Data indicates that the Directorate currently has the capacity to 
produce 160,000 cubic meters of healthy water.  
  
 According to an assessment by the Directorate of Water Supply, of all provinces, 
Herat (95%) has the highest level of access to healthy water and Kandahar and Mazar-e-
Sharif have the lowest levels (less than 16%). Kabul has the gravest problem in ensuring 
                                                           
170http://www.mrrd.gov.af/spd/Pillars.htm  




the right to water. Given the congestion of population and lack of a sewage system in this 
city, the absolute majority of underground water sources are contaminated and unsafe.  
About 70% of interviewees do not have access to healthy water and use wells that are not 
safely covered. The open sewage system is extremely worrisome as it pollutes water 
wells.173 HRFM data shows that 33.7% of people use unhealthy, unclean water.  
  
 The Directorate of Water Supply says it needs US$750m to complete an urban 
water supply grid.174 Currently, a water supply grid exists in 17 major cities and only 
30% of interviewees use tap water. But HRFM data shows that 7.5% of interviewees 
stand in queue for over an hour to get water. The Head of the Directorate criticized the 
government and international donors for their inattention to the development of a water 
supply grid and added that the Directorate faces an inadequate budget and low capacity.  
  
 It is difficult to access water in rural areas given the country’s successive 
droughts. In HRFM, 23.9% of interviewees stated that there are not enough water wells, 
4.4% stated that there are repeated water cuts, 3.5% stated that water wells are dry, 2.3% 
stated that water wells are destroyed, and 4.2% stated that well water is saline.  
  
 Rural dwellers are also suffering from the long distance of water sources. 
According to HRFM, 25.7% of interviewees stated they have to walk over 15 minutes 
one way to reach a usable water source, 8.0% (967 people) stated they have to walk over 
an hour one way to reach a usable water source. Although the Water Supply Department 
                                                           




of Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MoRRD) said it did not have 
accurate information in this respect, it also added that some people have to traverse a 
distance of around two hours one way to reach water sources.175 In addition, HRFM 
found out that approximately 62.7% of interviewees have problems in providing water 
for family use and 2.3% stated that they had to buy water.  
 
 
 Most water sources are open and there is no assurance of their safety. Open water 
sources are, especially in rural areas, used jointly by humans and animals. HRFM data 
shows that 20.4% of water sources are jointly used by humans and animals. The  
Department of Water Supply, Hygienic Education, and Environmental Sanitation of  
MoRRD has been able to dig 11,824 wells and 72 water supply grids in villages since 
(2002/03).176 According to the Head of the Department, so far 31% of rural people have 
access to healthy potable water and 90% of rural people are expected to have access to 
drinking water by 2013. Hygienic and sanitary education is important as most people lack 
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such an education. The aforesaid department has been able to present awareness- raising 
program to only 1.4 million people since (2002/03), while Afghanistan is second after 
Sudan to have the highest number of cases of water-borne diarrhea.  
  
 Water supply projects are administered by MoRRD and executed by the private 
sector. According to MoRRD’s Department of Water Supply, Hygienic Education, and  
Environment Sanitation, insecurity, lack of coordination, a weak private sector, and long 
bureaucratic procedures are the main challenges facing the development of the country’s 
water supply grid. Successive droughts 
have rendered many water wells built by 
the Directorate and other institutions dry 
and unusable. The Directorate said that 
assessment has begun, but it estimates that 




5. Development: Situation Analysis 
 Afghanistan had made progress since December 2001 in the aftermath of a 
generation of conflict that left the country devastated, but recent upsurge in violence has 
stalled and in some areas reversed progress. While the gross domestic product has grown 
steadily, to $12,850 million in 2008, the 24 per cent inflation rate places an increasing 
burden on the poor. Growing insecurity and the recurrence of violence affect service 
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delivery, accessibility, and private-sector development and employment, and causes 
population displacement. Anti-government elements, combined with factional, tribal and 
community conflicts, all contribute to instability. Weak rule of law, corruption, narco-
trafficking and an inability to protect the civilian population in many areas, and their 
basic human rights remain a major cause for concern. The most affected tend to be the 
poor and vulnerable, particularly the women. With a female literacy rate of a mere 14 per 
cent, Afghan women face formidable challenges. Gender based violence is very high and 
access to justice as well as livelihood opportunities is severely limited for women. At the 
same time, humanitarian space is being squeezed, with over 30 per cent of the territory 
inaccessible to UN, implementing partners and even Government service providers. 
Humanitarian aid is being increasingly met by military based actors causing confusion in 
perception in the minds of the people.  
 
 The human development indicator for Afghanistan is not available, but other 
indicators depict the challenge: a 42.9-year life expectancy (2005 data). The under-five 
mortality rate – 191 per 1,000 live births – shows modest improvement, as does the infant 
mortality rate, down to 129 per 1,000 live births, but both are among the highest in the 
world. While the adult literacy rate is 28 per cent – one of the lowest in the world – 
primary completion rates are gradually improving (from 25 per cent to 38 per cent since 
2005). The most significant improvement has been witnessed in the maternal mortality 
rate, cut in half from a staggering 1,600 to 800 per 100,000 births over the past few years. 
In critical Millennium Development Goals, such as extreme poverty and hunger, the trend 
is regressing: 42 per cent of population lives below the poverty line, as compared to 33 
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per cent in 2005. The poorest now comprises 10.5 percent of the population, as compared 
to 9.3 per cent in 2005, and 39 per cent of the population receive less than the minimum 
level of dietary energy consumption, compared to 30 per cent in 2005. Despite the efforts 
of the international community and the enormous resources invested, human 
development is showing improvement only in the health and education indicators.   
 
 The private sector and civil society are fragile, though economic growth is stable. 
In 2008, 89 per cent of the total national budget was funded from external sources. While 
the development budget is still funded entirely by international donors, only 40 per cent 
of the operational budget is mobilized locally. This underlines the need for the 
international community to remain engaged in supporting Afghanistan. The international 
community, increasingly coordinated by the United Nations, serves as an important pillar 
of support to the Afghan people in this transition. 
 
 Significant challenges remain. Overall, the analysis shows that security, 
governance and human development challenges are inextricably linked, and long-term 
investments targeting the poorest will be required to ensure that the human development 
trajectory of the country is in the right direction. The Afghanistan national development 
strategy has been formulated and adopted. It projects “a vision of a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous Afghanistan, based on the principles of Islam, outlining the priorities of the 
Government in terms of security, governance, development and humanitarian 
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domains”.178 The Government, in consultation with the international community, has 
developed a strategic plan for its implementation and is moving forward with it.   
 
6. Past cooperation and lessons learned  
  Since early 2002 the UNDP program in Afghanistan has supported stabilization, 
state- building, governance and development, so far disbursing in the region of $1.5 
billion. UNDP support, in partnership with the government, the United Nations system, 
the donor community and other development stakeholders, has contributed to the 
emergency Loya Jirga; adoption of the Constitution; presidential, parliamentary and 
provincial council elections; institutional development through capacity-building to the 
legislature, the judicial and executive arms of the state, and key ministries, government 
agencies and commissions at the national and sub national levels. UNDP has played a 
key role in the management of the Law and Order Trust Fund, which supports the 
Government in developing and maintaining the national police force and in efforts to 
stabilize the internal security environment. Like many other strategic UNDP programs in 
Afghanistan, the Trust Fund has benefited, and continues to benefit, from the very active 
support of donors. Major demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation and area-based 
livelihoods and reconstruction programs have taken place nationwide. UNDP also 
supported the formulation of the first ever, Millennium Development Goals-based 
Afghanistan national development strategy, and the Government is institutionalizing and 
promoting its implementation.  
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 The new country program builds on the lessons from the assessment of 
development results for the period 2002-2007, which was recently completed by the 
UNDP Evaluation Office. The assessment pointed to the need for UNDP to strengthen its 
coherence and provide more substantive programs in the next phase of assistance, 
building on the new direction adopted in 2005. It recommended that UNDP adopt a more 
direct presence outside Kabul to enhance the outreach of its programs to ordinary 
Afghans. While this has to be balanced with security concerns, it is a key objective in this 
new country program, as an emphasis on secure provinces in the past cycle undermined 
development for large segments of the population. UNDP invested heavily in central 
institutional development; however, the positive impact of the lives of Afghans was 
limited, and more must be done to improve state-society relationships, trust and 
confidence. To strengthen accountability, the assessment recommended improved 
reporting of development results from interventions and better integration of UNDP 
programs and coordination with UNAMA and the United Nations system as a whole. It 
noted that the donor practice of paying government salaries and supplements and creating 
externally funded implementation units affected sustainability.   
 
 The new country program takes these lessons and recommendations into account 
and will build on the foundations laid during the last cycle. It will focus on institution-
building and will support ongoing efforts to systematically build capacities within the 
government and civil society and to deepen the functioning of transparent and 
accountable democratic governance. Emphasis will be increasingly placed on sub-
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national governance, a pro-poor private sector, and livelihood development programs 
aimed towards the most vulnerable groups.179   
 
VI Summary and Conclusion 
 In this research I intended to identify the impediments of development and 
state building and how to overcome the development and stability roadblocks that 
Afghanistan faces today.  The failures and successes of Afghanistan’s development 
argued in this paper could be summarized as such; the economic activity in Afghanistan 
turned to double-digit growth rates in 2007 as a consequence of both a recovering in the 
agriculture sector and after the 2006 drought and a large demand impulse based on donor 
financed spending and drug money. Growth in the medium and long term is expected to 
decline, and will depend on improvement on governance and a successful integration into 
the world economy. Private sector investment has still not recuperated from peak levels 
in 2005.  Pressured to increase revenues, the government is taking the wrong steps by 
overtaxing the formal sector (while offering no public goods in exchange) and increasing 
tax uncertainty especially to large taxpayers, instead of broadening the tax structure by 
means of increasing investment and formalizing part of the legal but informal economy. 
We then moved to define a proper definition that suits Afghanistan’s 
development. In the case of Afghanistan, development consists of citizens having 
economic and social rights in their homeland. The government should do more than just 
acknowledge that the human rights obligations in the international treaties to which 
Afghanistan is a state party are an applicable legal framework for its National 






Development Strategy and that the strategy must not be in violation of these obligations. 
The government needs to explicitly recognize that the National Development Strategy is 
a step towards the full realization of rights recognized in international human rights 
instruments.  Further, we discussed and analyzed the economic reconstruction and public 
health context in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010. The country has very low quantity and 
a poor quality of human capital, however, there is no evidence this is a constraining 
factor for the private sector at the present time.  In addition to this, geographical 
challenges, including being landlocked and the challenges that are imposed for Afghan 
exports, as they must transit into neighboring countries, add to the list of constraining 
issues. Geography combined with the lack of adequate infrastructure in particular related 
to the agribusiness (transportation, irrigation, value-chain links) and other potentially 
exporting sectors, appear to be the second most binding constraint to economic activity, 
and it is the most important challenge for the country in the long-term perspective.  
  Afghanistan still today has a basic agricultural and manufacturing infrastructure 
that was destroyed and has not fully recuperated; economic and political institutions have 
been weakened; and the domestic and international markets for Afghanistan’s food 
supplies, livestock, and manufactured good have been disrupted or lost. Ethnic and 
regional tensions plague a fragmented society, and human capital has deteriorated from 
years of interrupted health and education and training, and from the steady decline in 
health and social services.  
Afghanistan’s Health sector has made the most progress. But with the health 
sector growth and the market share recovery, these elements of growth suggest that there 
is still a possibility to overcome the infrastructure limitation. In order to overcome these 
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limitations, Afghanistan’s government must implement the rule of law on its state. 
According to the Human Development Index, Afghanistan is the second least developed 
country in the world. Goals that Afghanistan must achieve: The National Priority 
Programs Priority program mentions six initial goals that Afghanistan must reach: (i) to 
unite Government, donors, the private sector, NGOs, and civil society around national 
policies; (ii) to create efficiency, accountability, and transparency in public spending; (iii) 
to enable resources to be allocated for large national programs, as opposed to smaller and 
less efficient projects; (iv) to enhance the leadership and ownership of Government and 
Ministries in the reconstruction process; and (v) to enhance provincial equity in national 
program execution180. 
 Governance systems in Afghanistan are still weak and state’s authority 
barely extends beyond the capital. As you’ve read in this research paper these issues are 
the reason why Afghanistan is so dependent on the aid of donor government, 
international aid agencies, international organizations and NGOs to help it reach the 
developmental change beyond the capital in order to create a united growth across the 
country. These organizations are not to overlook opportunities, repeat mistakes, and 
ignore threats and complexities, and waste resources. 
 We then have evaluated potential routes to improve the distorted 
reconstruction process in Afghanistan, by focusing on critical sociocultural aspects of 
Afghan society.  To start with, the Afghan government and international development 
agencies must conduct a closer study of what people on the ground actually desire and 
need, and in what priority they rank those needs.  If the Kabul-based government and 
countless international aid agencies carry on with their own insular notions of what is 
                                                           
DFID Understanding Afghanistan, Report 2010. 
93 
 
important for Afghanistan’s reconstruction without consulting its heterogeneous peoples, 
rebuilding the country will be an impossible project—out of touch with the practical 
needs and desires of people on the ground, and constantly battling a stubborn insurgency 
that is growing which restricts the reconstruction process. Rather, for a sustainable peace 
to take root in Afghanistan again, reconstruction agencies must, as a start, substantially 
increase their knowledge and understanding of the diverse legal cultures and systems of 
law that operate, de facto, on the ground in Afghanistan.  Meanwhile there is an urgent 
need for outside forces to respect local law that resonates with the lives of its people, 
however unfamiliar to the foreign eye.  Beyond this, the same international forces now 
controlling reconstruction must relinquish the notions that creating an Afghanistan in a 
Western secular-liberal society’s self-image, is nearly impossible. The local socio-legal 
actors on the ground must take into consideration: the responsibility of building stable 
and self-supporting civil institutions on the foundation of their own unique Afghani local 
histories and modes of conflict resolution, a substantial portion of which is rooted in 
Islamic law.  
  
  Furthermore, the findings of the UNDP and Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy, analysis remind us of how fragile the Afghan economy is and that much more 
should be done in order to put the country on a path for sustainable development. There 
are severe deficiencies in every aspect covered by the UNDP and ANDS framework, 
which all indicate that Afghanistan economy has limited access to formal finance (mostly 
international aid) and most investments are international organization and it needs more 
help. On the other hand when analyzing the financial market, we can conclude that due to 
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poor strategic planning and not lack of domestic savings, the state has hard time 
maintaining a stable economy. Banks are not providing credit to the private sector and 
limit their activities to basic services focused on urban areas, foreign and donor 
community. This is in part due to severe property rights and rule enforcement issues. 
 
 
In order to attain the ideal result, it is important to work towards creating a robust 
rule of law, practice and atmosphere; doing so is essential if Afghanistan seeks to revive 
its economy and provide hope and opportunity to its long-battered constituents.  
Additionally there’s a need to curb corruption of the Karzai Government but also across 
different spheres, economical political, police and the military. In order to accomplish the 
goal set by the developmental multinational institutions and the Afghani government 
itself, Afghanistan needs to work on different levels simultaneously and create structures 
for cooperation among the various spheres of influence by not only focusing on a 
hierarchical structure of top to bottom commandeering, but also lateral cooperation 
among all levels of government and society. In my research I identified the success and 
failures of Afghanistan’s development and the cause and effect of each success or failure, 
and drew conclusions of what steps need to be taken in order to plan a better future for 
Afghanistan. 
 I was able to show where Afghanistan’s development has flourished, mostly 
in the health and economic areas, but development has not been able to expand to other 
areas such as security and human rights, these areas are still very weak and need 
improvement. Further development depends on security, and how to build stability within 
Afghanistan. Is that a responsibility that the United Nations or the United States wants to 
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be in charge of is NATO going to take the lead, or is NATO better off leaving this task to 
Afghanistan’s neighboring states, for the region to settle its own issues independently? 
Ultimately, Afghanistan’s history would teach us, however, that this is not the first time 
foreign powers underestimated the resilience of indigenous people in this war-torn 
country. The challenges in the future remains as to whether future U.S. administrations, 
global development agencies, and other international actors will heed such lessons in 
time to prevent a repeat of the past’s catastrophic chain of events. Among many some 
policy recommendation that most growth strategy organizations make are: most urgent 
reforms in Afghanistan should focus the energy and political and human capital, and 
donors support in both technical capacity and funding on (i) further reforming the tax 
collection process and agents, and reducing the “nuisance” taxes and multiplicity of fees; 
(ii) addressing the widespread corruption, (iii) focusing investments in infrastructure 
projects directly related to increase competitiveness in the tradable sector, and (iv) 
securing trade facilitation and transit rights in the region to effectively exploit the 
regional and world market181. 
 
To these 4 major points, it is also crucial to work toward creating a robust practice 
of the rule of law, creating security and focusing on effective development strategies. 
Doing so is essential if Afghanistan seeks to revive its economy and provide hope and 
opportunity to its long-battered constituents.  In order to accomplish the goal set by 
multinational institutions, NGOs and the Afghani government, coordination and 
cooperation must be done on multiple levels between these entities and one coordination 
entity must be formed that will be responsible and accountable for development.  
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